Monday, November 28, 2005
The Times editorial on Atlantic Yards: spirit without subsidies?
So the New York Times finally weighs in with an editorial about Atlantic Yards, and while it acknowledges some of the important changes (or, some might say, false promises) in the plan and repeats a criticism of subsidies absent from the previous editorial, it maintains a vague Marty Markowitz-esque call for the plan to be scaled down, unfairly criticizes local opponents as NIMBYs, and praises the "spirit" of the development without acknowledging the avoidance of public process.
The 11/27/05 editorial, headlined A Matter of Scale in Brooklyn , appeared in the City Weekly section. As I pointed out in my report, editorials on such an important topic should appear in the main editorial section. After all, state residents would help pay for the project and a state agency is supervising it, also, it would have an impact on the tristate area as well as on development nationally.
First, the Times acknowledges the changes:
When it was first put forward, the proposed Atlantic Yards mega-development in Brooklyn offered some excellent features, most particularly affordable housing and jobs for local residents. The project seemed promising, if the developer could address the biggest downside: the addition of traffic downtown, where the streets are already clogged. Since then, the plan has become bigger and the number of prospective jobs smaller, and there could be even worse traffic congestion.
The project has an evolving razzle-dazzle Frank Gehry design and an 18,000-seat arena for the Nets basketball team, which could become a real anchor for development - unlike the doomed plan for a football stadium on the West Side of Manhattan, which would have deadened, rather than enlivened, the neighborhood around it. But the project has grown by nearly one million square feet since its unveiling two years ago. For economic, aesthetic and practical reasons, it should be pared back.
Change is normal for a massive project, and this one covers some 21 acres, including the arena, 16 other buildings and 7 acres of green space. But what should remain constant is the spirit of the development. The developer, Bruce Ratner (a partner of The Times in developing its new headquarters), earned much good will by reaching out to surrounding communities and pledging that 50 percent of the housing units would be pegged to low- and middle-income residents. That is no longer the case, given the planned addition of nearly 3,000 apartments for sale at market prices, though another 1,000 moderately priced units could be added off the site.
Reaching out to surrounding communities? The story behind BUILD is a bit more complicated.
Traffic downtown? The project would be located outside Downtown Brooklyn, and thus would have an impact on traffic both in the downtown area and in the neighborhoods surround the project (including Prospect Heights, Boerum Hill, Fort Greene, and Park Slope).
The Times continues:
Meanwhile, the number of jobs projected may be a small fraction of the original 10,000 promised, in part because commercial square footage has given way to additional housing.
Has given way is a passive construction and obscures the reason. As the Times has already reported, the developer needs to build more luxury housing to pay for the affordable housing. There´s another way to look at it: for Forest City Ratner to make the profit it desires (a figure we don't know). And another, as noted in my report: less commercial space means the site wouldn't compete with Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver's Lower Manhattan district, and thus Silver would be more likely to approve state subsidies.
The Times continues:
Mr. Ratner has always made it clear that he expects government aid in preparing the arena site, and the city and state have each committed to pitch in $100 million in cash to help. There is no reason to expect taxpayer money to be used to help fund a profit-making real estate venture like this one; those costs should be absorbed by the builder.
This is a significant point. In Chapter 13 of my report, I criticized the Times's 7/10/05 City Weekly editorial (Skyscrapers Grow in Brooklyn) for ignoring previous opposition to subsidies. A more pointed editorial (A Triple Play for New York Teams, 3/27/05, national edition) stated:
But given the enormous profitability of this sports market, the idea of adding on public subsidies is ridiculous. Sports teams should pay their own way. That includes “infrastructure improvements,” unless that infrastructure is something that was already wanted and needed by the community. The community, by the way, should be consulted whether the law requires it or not.
...A mixed-use development like this could be a shot in the arm for the local economy. The low- and moderate-income housing units would be a big plus, and the developer has agreed to pay fair market value for the railyards at the site. But the city and state are each supposed to contribute $100 million to build streets and sidewalks and prepare the site for development. That’s unnecessary: Mr. Ratner should pay his own way. He should also make more of an effort to work with the community.
Still, the Times's position is incomplete. While there would be $200 million in direct subsidies, the 30-year public costs were estimated by Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey at $1.1 billion at a City Council hearing last May. Forest City Ratner officials say that some subsidies are "as of right," which means they'd be part of any project that includes affordable housing, but street closings and other infrastructure improvements would not necessarily be included. We need a much more specific accounting of the costs and benefits.
At least, however, the Times has maintained some consistency with its previous editorial stance. The editorial continues:
It's understandable that residents bordering the project do not want such drastic change, but that in itself is no reason to stop the development. It is difficult to build in New York as it is. Growth would come to a screeching halt forever if neighborhoods could veto projects to keep the status quo. But the residents are absolutely right in pointing out that traffic in the area, especially at Flatbush and Atlantic Avenues, is already atrocious almost any time of day - even on weekends. Mr. Ratner wants to promote use of mass transit, which makes sense, considering that the site sits over a major hub for the subway and Long Island Rail Road. Mr. Ratner will also improve the yards as part of the deal. Still, more innovation is needed, like the idea of using a system of shuttle buses and satellite parking for arena events.
The Times repeats John Manbeck's hollow NIMBY charge. Neighborhoods don't want a veto, but they do want local elected officials to have a voice.
As noted in Chapter 13 of my report, the Times´s 7/10/05 editorial also ignored a previous call for an independent report on the costs and benefits of the project. Without hearkening back to that call, the new editorial continues:
The city's nonpartisan Independent Budget Office calculates the arena would produce a modest benefit for the city and state, $107 million over 30 years. Even that may be optimistic - the budget office's projections for the Jets stadium of $210 million over a similar period were based on hopeful and maybe unachievable predictions of its use as a convention space.
The Nets arena is not destined to be a cash cow, but the borough deserves a sports team, so long as the price is not too high. A basketball arena is more likely to get multipurpose use than a football stadium, and since the team plays several times a week for a long season rather than 10 times a year, its impact on the area's night life should be positive.
The Atlantic Yards project deserves to keep moving forward. But the focus now needs to be on building something that is still grand but also manageable.
So long as the price is not too high? This is not an arena project. This is an arena along with 16 buildings, nearly all housing, and mostly luxury housing. So, isn't it time to try to evaluate the budget projections for the project as a whole? The Times cannot suggest that the IBO report, which focused on the arena, is definitive. Moreover, the agency did note much higher potential costs than did developer's consultant. The IBO report also cited a figure of nearly twice as much office space as currently projected, and 6,000 apartments rather than the currently projected figure of 7,300.
That 3/27/05 Times editorial noted: The community, by the way, should be consulted whether the law requires it or not.
That's been significantly absent from this process. And it's notable that the Times, in an 11/27/05 editorial (The Shame of Palookaville) about a Westchester project by the very same developer, lauds the role of public participation. In Yonkers, there's a city council, and in Westchester, there's a county planning board. By contrast, the Brooklyn project was presented as a fait accompli. It's not a question of neighborhoods vetoing projects, it's a question of avoiding local elected officials.
The 11/27/05 editorial, headlined A Matter of Scale in Brooklyn , appeared in the City Weekly section. As I pointed out in my report, editorials on such an important topic should appear in the main editorial section. After all, state residents would help pay for the project and a state agency is supervising it, also, it would have an impact on the tristate area as well as on development nationally.
First, the Times acknowledges the changes:
When it was first put forward, the proposed Atlantic Yards mega-development in Brooklyn offered some excellent features, most particularly affordable housing and jobs for local residents. The project seemed promising, if the developer could address the biggest downside: the addition of traffic downtown, where the streets are already clogged. Since then, the plan has become bigger and the number of prospective jobs smaller, and there could be even worse traffic congestion.
The project has an evolving razzle-dazzle Frank Gehry design and an 18,000-seat arena for the Nets basketball team, which could become a real anchor for development - unlike the doomed plan for a football stadium on the West Side of Manhattan, which would have deadened, rather than enlivened, the neighborhood around it. But the project has grown by nearly one million square feet since its unveiling two years ago. For economic, aesthetic and practical reasons, it should be pared back.
Change is normal for a massive project, and this one covers some 21 acres, including the arena, 16 other buildings and 7 acres of green space. But what should remain constant is the spirit of the development. The developer, Bruce Ratner (a partner of The Times in developing its new headquarters), earned much good will by reaching out to surrounding communities and pledging that 50 percent of the housing units would be pegged to low- and middle-income residents. That is no longer the case, given the planned addition of nearly 3,000 apartments for sale at market prices, though another 1,000 moderately priced units could be added off the site.
Reaching out to surrounding communities? The story behind BUILD is a bit more complicated.
Traffic downtown? The project would be located outside Downtown Brooklyn, and thus would have an impact on traffic both in the downtown area and in the neighborhoods surround the project (including Prospect Heights, Boerum Hill, Fort Greene, and Park Slope).
The Times continues:
Meanwhile, the number of jobs projected may be a small fraction of the original 10,000 promised, in part because commercial square footage has given way to additional housing.
Has given way is a passive construction and obscures the reason. As the Times has already reported, the developer needs to build more luxury housing to pay for the affordable housing. There´s another way to look at it: for Forest City Ratner to make the profit it desires (a figure we don't know). And another, as noted in my report: less commercial space means the site wouldn't compete with Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver's Lower Manhattan district, and thus Silver would be more likely to approve state subsidies.
The Times continues:
Mr. Ratner has always made it clear that he expects government aid in preparing the arena site, and the city and state have each committed to pitch in $100 million in cash to help. There is no reason to expect taxpayer money to be used to help fund a profit-making real estate venture like this one; those costs should be absorbed by the builder.
This is a significant point. In Chapter 13 of my report, I criticized the Times's 7/10/05 City Weekly editorial (Skyscrapers Grow in Brooklyn) for ignoring previous opposition to subsidies. A more pointed editorial (A Triple Play for New York Teams, 3/27/05, national edition) stated:
But given the enormous profitability of this sports market, the idea of adding on public subsidies is ridiculous. Sports teams should pay their own way. That includes “infrastructure improvements,” unless that infrastructure is something that was already wanted and needed by the community. The community, by the way, should be consulted whether the law requires it or not.
...A mixed-use development like this could be a shot in the arm for the local economy. The low- and moderate-income housing units would be a big plus, and the developer has agreed to pay fair market value for the railyards at the site. But the city and state are each supposed to contribute $100 million to build streets and sidewalks and prepare the site for development. That’s unnecessary: Mr. Ratner should pay his own way. He should also make more of an effort to work with the community.
Still, the Times's position is incomplete. While there would be $200 million in direct subsidies, the 30-year public costs were estimated by Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey at $1.1 billion at a City Council hearing last May. Forest City Ratner officials say that some subsidies are "as of right," which means they'd be part of any project that includes affordable housing, but street closings and other infrastructure improvements would not necessarily be included. We need a much more specific accounting of the costs and benefits.
At least, however, the Times has maintained some consistency with its previous editorial stance. The editorial continues:
It's understandable that residents bordering the project do not want such drastic change, but that in itself is no reason to stop the development. It is difficult to build in New York as it is. Growth would come to a screeching halt forever if neighborhoods could veto projects to keep the status quo. But the residents are absolutely right in pointing out that traffic in the area, especially at Flatbush and Atlantic Avenues, is already atrocious almost any time of day - even on weekends. Mr. Ratner wants to promote use of mass transit, which makes sense, considering that the site sits over a major hub for the subway and Long Island Rail Road. Mr. Ratner will also improve the yards as part of the deal. Still, more innovation is needed, like the idea of using a system of shuttle buses and satellite parking for arena events.
The Times repeats John Manbeck's hollow NIMBY charge. Neighborhoods don't want a veto, but they do want local elected officials to have a voice.
As noted in Chapter 13 of my report, the Times´s 7/10/05 editorial also ignored a previous call for an independent report on the costs and benefits of the project. Without hearkening back to that call, the new editorial continues:
The city's nonpartisan Independent Budget Office calculates the arena would produce a modest benefit for the city and state, $107 million over 30 years. Even that may be optimistic - the budget office's projections for the Jets stadium of $210 million over a similar period were based on hopeful and maybe unachievable predictions of its use as a convention space.
The Nets arena is not destined to be a cash cow, but the borough deserves a sports team, so long as the price is not too high. A basketball arena is more likely to get multipurpose use than a football stadium, and since the team plays several times a week for a long season rather than 10 times a year, its impact on the area's night life should be positive.
The Atlantic Yards project deserves to keep moving forward. But the focus now needs to be on building something that is still grand but also manageable.
So long as the price is not too high? This is not an arena project. This is an arena along with 16 buildings, nearly all housing, and mostly luxury housing. So, isn't it time to try to evaluate the budget projections for the project as a whole? The Times cannot suggest that the IBO report, which focused on the arena, is definitive. Moreover, the agency did note much higher potential costs than did developer's consultant. The IBO report also cited a figure of nearly twice as much office space as currently projected, and 6,000 apartments rather than the currently projected figure of 7,300.
That 3/27/05 Times editorial noted: The community, by the way, should be consulted whether the law requires it or not.
That's been significantly absent from this process. And it's notable that the Times, in an 11/27/05 editorial (The Shame of Palookaville) about a Westchester project by the very same developer, lauds the role of public participation. In Yonkers, there's a city council, and in Westchester, there's a county planning board. By contrast, the Brooklyn project was presented as a fait accompli. It's not a question of neighborhoods vetoing projects, it's a question of avoiding local elected officials.
Saturday, November 26, 2005
Gehry's "horrible" sketches & their treatment by the Times
So I missed Frank Gehry's presentation the other day (I'm traveling), but I was intrigued that Gehry apparently described the 7/5/05 presentation of his sketches in the New York Times as "horrible." Let's remember what Times architecture critic Nicolai Ouroussoff wrote at the time, as noted in Chapter 14 of my report:
What is unfolding is an urban model of remarkable richness and texture, one that could begin to inject energy into the bloodless formulas that are slowly draining our cities of their vitality...
Mr. Gehry is still fiddling with these forms. His earliest sketches have a palpable tension, as if he were ripping open the city to release its hidden energy. The towers in a more recent model seem clunkier and more brooding. This past weekend, a group of three undulating glass towers suddenly appeared. Anchored by lower brick buildings on both sides, they resemble great big billowing clouds.
Now Gehry may have simply been referring to the graphical presentation that was provided exclusively to the Times. (Did Gehry's office provide it? It's not clear, but I think it was more likely the developer, Forest City Ratner.) Still, it would be interesting to hear what Gehry has to say about the critic's rhapsodic assessment.
What is unfolding is an urban model of remarkable richness and texture, one that could begin to inject energy into the bloodless formulas that are slowly draining our cities of their vitality...
Mr. Gehry is still fiddling with these forms. His earliest sketches have a palpable tension, as if he were ripping open the city to release its hidden energy. The towers in a more recent model seem clunkier and more brooding. This past weekend, a group of three undulating glass towers suddenly appeared. Anchored by lower brick buildings on both sides, they resemble great big billowing clouds.
Now Gehry may have simply been referring to the graphical presentation that was provided exclusively to the Times. (Did Gehry's office provide it? It's not clear, but I think it was more likely the developer, Forest City Ratner.) Still, it would be interesting to hear what Gehry has to say about the critic's rhapsodic assessment.
Monday, November 21, 2005
The Times only partly corrects the Atlantic Yards op-ed
On 11/13/05, the Times ran its first op-ed on Atlantic Yards and, as noted, the piece contained errors both small and large. But the Times's 11/20/05 correction addressed only two obvious errors of fact:
An Op-Ed last Sunday about the Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn misstated some of its details. Plans for the project call for 16 buildings surrounding a sports arena, not 17, and for nine million square feet of construction, not 14 million.
Let's put aside the broader errors, such as the mischaracterization of project critics as NIMBYs, and consider another statistical error. Commentator John Manbeck described Forest City Ratner Companies' plan to build a sports arena surrounded by 17 imposing high-rise buildings on the Atlantic Avenue railyards.
The railyard constitutes only a little more than a third of the proposed 22-acre project site. Also, Manbeck's description could lead to the conclusion that the developer's purchase of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority land precludes any need for further negotiation with other property owners and the use of eminent domain.
A more precise yet still concise description could have been "on and around the Atlantic Avenue railyards." On 9/15/05, a Times article (Arena Project For Brooklyn Wins Approval From M.T.A.) described plans to build the arena at the railyard and 7,300 apartments in 16 buildings on adjacent land, as well as office space, stores and parks.
Why didn't the Times correct Manbeck's error--do editors think "on the Atlantic Avenue railyards" is accurate shorthand? Is it that correcting Manbeck's error would require the Times to correct the error made by then-architecture critic Herbert Muschamp in his initial 12/11/03 assessment of the plan? Under the headline "Courtside Seats to an Urban Garden," Muschamp wrote: The six-block site is adjacent to Atlantic Terminal, where the Long Island Rail Road and nine subway lines converge. It is now an open railyard.
I have requested correction of that error twice before. Now, I guess, it's an issue for the Public Editor.
An Op-Ed last Sunday about the Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn misstated some of its details. Plans for the project call for 16 buildings surrounding a sports arena, not 17, and for nine million square feet of construction, not 14 million.
Let's put aside the broader errors, such as the mischaracterization of project critics as NIMBYs, and consider another statistical error. Commentator John Manbeck described Forest City Ratner Companies' plan to build a sports arena surrounded by 17 imposing high-rise buildings on the Atlantic Avenue railyards.
The railyard constitutes only a little more than a third of the proposed 22-acre project site. Also, Manbeck's description could lead to the conclusion that the developer's purchase of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority land precludes any need for further negotiation with other property owners and the use of eminent domain.
A more precise yet still concise description could have been "on and around the Atlantic Avenue railyards." On 9/15/05, a Times article (Arena Project For Brooklyn Wins Approval From M.T.A.) described plans to build the arena at the railyard and 7,300 apartments in 16 buildings on adjacent land, as well as office space, stores and parks.
Why didn't the Times correct Manbeck's error--do editors think "on the Atlantic Avenue railyards" is accurate shorthand? Is it that correcting Manbeck's error would require the Times to correct the error made by then-architecture critic Herbert Muschamp in his initial 12/11/03 assessment of the plan? Under the headline "Courtside Seats to an Urban Garden," Muschamp wrote: The six-block site is adjacent to Atlantic Terminal, where the Long Island Rail Road and nine subway lines converge. It is now an open railyard.
I have requested correction of that error twice before. Now, I guess, it's an issue for the Public Editor.
Saturday, November 19, 2005
Jason Kidd, "comprehensive" planning, and the Ratner p.r. machine
A 11/18/05 New York Times sports column (subscriber-only), even one that acknowledged "Step One in the community-relations phase of Ratner's grand plan," couldn't help from misconstruing a key point about the Atlantic Yards project, and giving Jason Kidd a bit of a pass.
Harvey Araton's column concerned point guard Kidd's new spiritual faith, thanks to a mentoring relationship and membership in [the Rev. A.R.] Bernard's Christian Cultural Center on Flatlands Avenue in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn.
This mega-church, likely Brooklyn's largest, was the site of a media event where Kidd and the Nets served an early Thanksgiving meal to needy families.
Kidd, we learn, has flourished:
"Jason was reluctant at first," Bernard said in a telephone interview. ''But he began to enjoy, and over time he began a transformation of his values, his relationships and his work."
Engaging in some celebrity name-dropping, Bernard said that the Jets' Curtis Martin was a member of his community, as were Starr Jones and Angela Bassett. They and the Kidds are part of a congregation of more than 20,000 that promotes conservative Christian values.
Unmentioned is Kidd's troubled history with his wife Joumana. I think it's wrong when fans taunt Kidd about being arrested in 2001 for hitting her. And it's admirable if Kidd, as it seems, has transformed his values and relationships, and, in Bernard's words, is "accepting and appreciating what he already has." But if he's going to be suggested as a role model, isn't it worth mentioning what Kidd may be transforming from?
More troublingly, Araton tries to describe the polar attitudes toward the Atlantic Yards plan, but gets it wrong: whether you believe the Nets' relocation plan is a cover for Ratner to build apartment buildings or a comprehensive development plan for downtown Brooklyn whose time has come.
Not even Borough President Marty Markowitz bills this as a comprehensive development plan, especially since the project would be in Prospect Heights and Park Slope, not Downtown Brooklyn. In Marty's latest State of the Borough address, he said, "I expect Atlantic Yards to result in two things that are vital to Brooklynites — more jobs and more affordable housing." As we know, there are many fewer jobs than promised, and a smaller percentage of affordable housing. And there's been no inkling of comprehensive planning. Marty wanted an arena, above all--the rest is a real estate project that has shifted significantly, by the developer's decision. And all the planning has been after the fact.
Harvey Araton's column concerned point guard Kidd's new spiritual faith, thanks to a mentoring relationship and membership in [the Rev. A.R.] Bernard's Christian Cultural Center on Flatlands Avenue in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn.
This mega-church, likely Brooklyn's largest, was the site of a media event where Kidd and the Nets served an early Thanksgiving meal to needy families.
Kidd, we learn, has flourished:
"Jason was reluctant at first," Bernard said in a telephone interview. ''But he began to enjoy, and over time he began a transformation of his values, his relationships and his work."
Engaging in some celebrity name-dropping, Bernard said that the Jets' Curtis Martin was a member of his community, as were Starr Jones and Angela Bassett. They and the Kidds are part of a congregation of more than 20,000 that promotes conservative Christian values.
Unmentioned is Kidd's troubled history with his wife Joumana. I think it's wrong when fans taunt Kidd about being arrested in 2001 for hitting her. And it's admirable if Kidd, as it seems, has transformed his values and relationships, and, in Bernard's words, is "accepting and appreciating what he already has." But if he's going to be suggested as a role model, isn't it worth mentioning what Kidd may be transforming from?
More troublingly, Araton tries to describe the polar attitudes toward the Atlantic Yards plan, but gets it wrong: whether you believe the Nets' relocation plan is a cover for Ratner to build apartment buildings or a comprehensive development plan for downtown Brooklyn whose time has come.
Not even Borough President Marty Markowitz bills this as a comprehensive development plan, especially since the project would be in Prospect Heights and Park Slope, not Downtown Brooklyn. In Marty's latest State of the Borough address, he said, "I expect Atlantic Yards to result in two things that are vital to Brooklynites — more jobs and more affordable housing." As we know, there are many fewer jobs than promised, and a smaller percentage of affordable housing. And there's been no inkling of comprehensive planning. Marty wanted an arena, above all--the rest is a real estate project that has shifted significantly, by the developer's decision. And all the planning has been after the fact.
Brooklyn Standard mystery solved, partly: second issue relies more on Ratner staff
In a previous post, I wondered whether the second issue of Forest City Ratner's deceptive Brooklyn Standard used fake bylines, especially since Managing Editor Tom Allon wouldn't answer any questions about Brigitte Labonte and Kim Last, two bylines on the front page along with a journalist whose name was attached to a story he didn't write.
On Friday, I got a partial answer. During a walkthrough of downtown Brooklyn with Danish urban planner/architect Jan Gehl, two Forest City Ratner employees, Brigitte Labonte and Jeff Rothberg, joined the assembled journalists, urban planners, and civic activists. (FCR was invited.) Both employees have bylines in the second issue of the Standard: Labonte wrote about the "landmark" Community Benefits Agreement signed by Ratner and Rothberg wrote about a basketball camp sponsored by Ratner and the proposed arena, "the heart of Atlantic Yards." (Others might call it a tail wagging a very large dog, given that it would be near the western border of the site and would cover less than ten percent of the total square footage.)
This suggests that Forest City Ratner employees had a greater role in the second issue than the first issue. While Ratner employees are listed as editors in chief of the Brooklyn Standard, Allon and fellow Manhattan Media staffer Edward-Isaac Dovere, listed as the publication's Executive Editor, had two and four bylines, respectively, in the first issue. Neither had a byline in the second issue. Is it because they want to distance themselves from a publication unlike their more legitimate weekly newspapers?
And what of the mysterious Kim Last? The switchboard operator at Forest City Ratner didn't have anyone listed under that name. So that question remains.
On Friday, I got a partial answer. During a walkthrough of downtown Brooklyn with Danish urban planner/architect Jan Gehl, two Forest City Ratner employees, Brigitte Labonte and Jeff Rothberg, joined the assembled journalists, urban planners, and civic activists. (FCR was invited.) Both employees have bylines in the second issue of the Standard: Labonte wrote about the "landmark" Community Benefits Agreement signed by Ratner and Rothberg wrote about a basketball camp sponsored by Ratner and the proposed arena, "the heart of Atlantic Yards." (Others might call it a tail wagging a very large dog, given that it would be near the western border of the site and would cover less than ten percent of the total square footage.)
This suggests that Forest City Ratner employees had a greater role in the second issue than the first issue. While Ratner employees are listed as editors in chief of the Brooklyn Standard, Allon and fellow Manhattan Media staffer Edward-Isaac Dovere, listed as the publication's Executive Editor, had two and four bylines, respectively, in the first issue. Neither had a byline in the second issue. Is it because they want to distance themselves from a publication unlike their more legitimate weekly newspapers?
And what of the mysterious Kim Last? The switchboard operator at Forest City Ratner didn't have anyone listed under that name. So that question remains.
Friday, November 18, 2005
Marty Markowitz stays on message, except for that affordable housing twist
I ran into Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz at a civic event yesterday and took the opportunity to shake his hand, declare my recognition for his love of Brooklyn, and then question him cordially yet steadily on Atlantic Yards. (No, I didn't tell him I would post this--with anyone other than a political official I would--but Marty is always "on.")
Yes, he still thinks the project should be smaller, but he hasn't come up with any guidelines, at least not for public consumption, since he first acknowledged the need to downscale the project at a September 19 candidates' forum. Still, a 15% cut wouldn't return the project even to its starting place. So some perspective surely would help, as well as an acknowledgement--as City Councilman David Yassky and Assemblyman Jim Brennan have observed--that the planning process has been faulty.
So I mentioned to Marty that people were troubled by the undemocratic process behind the Atlantic Yards plan. "The people spoke last Tuesday," he declared, indicating (I suppose) that the reelection of him and Mayor Bloomberg represented an implicit endorsement of Atlantic Yards.
I asked if he was troubled by the tradeoff from office space (promises of jobs) to housing in the proposed project, as noted in a recent New York Times article. "The people of Brooklyn wanted more housing," he replied. Actually, in that same Times article, Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey acknowledged that the company needed to build more market-rate housing to pay for the affordable housing.
The people of Brooklyn? Was there a plebiscite? Stuckey told City Council last May, as noted in Chapter 1 of my report, that he had been "educated" by housing advocates (including ACORN) that "there is a dire need for residential development in New York City." So the developer then added 2,800 market-rate condos, with a possible 600-1,000 "affordable" condos to be built on or off site, geared to families in the "upper affordable income tiers," including some earning six figures. That's hardly ACORN's constituency. Given the $1.1 billion in public costs over 30 years acknowledged by Stuckey, shouldn't there be more discussion about whether luxury housing should be subsidized?
Marty said that the scale of the project might change, "but the arena is nonnegotiable." (Remember, Marty's goal has been to bring major league sports back to Brooklyn.) What about putting it Coney Island, a site he once supported? He said the transportation wasn't sufficient. Perhaps, though there's an argument that it's easier to empty out an arena into subways at the end of the line. More importantly, only now--after the project is well into the approval process--is the question of the project's transportation impact being discussed.
At a forum on Wednesday, Daniel Goldstein of Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB) mentioned a February 2004 meeting that community advocates had with representatives of Markowitz's office, Forest City Ratner, and architect Frank Gehry. As later reported by the Brooklyn Papers, a local architect suggested that Ratner tear down the much-criticized Atlantic Center mall and build the arena bridging Atlantic Avenue, thus avoiding eminent domain and the condemnation of private property. The developer cited security concerns. This past August, an unreleased Memorandum of Understanding dated Feb. 18, 2005 obtained by DDDB showed that Forest City Ratner may build up to 875,000 square feet of commercial office space and 711,000 feet of residential space on the Atlantic Center site. (It's unclear whether that would replace the mall or simply be placed on top of the mall.)
I told Marty that some people were skeptical about the developer. "There is no more socially conscious developer than Bruce Ratner," the borough president replied, quoting, uh, himself at the press conference regarding the affordable housing plan at Atlantic Yards. Is it socially conscious to rely on government subsidies and to impose gag orders (see Chapter 7 of my report) on those who sell property to the developer?
More crucially, when I mentioned to Marty that the developer had added market-rate housing to skew the 50 percent affordable housing promise, he barked back, "50 percent of the rentals." True, that is the letter of the housing Memorandum of Understanding but not the spirit: when the housing deal was announced, Marty and the press described it as 50 percent of all apartments at Atlantic Yards. At the time, Marty cited a "commitment to build a full 50 percent of Atlantic Yards housing as affordable." A week after that, as I've noted, the developer announced plans for the new condos.
Yes, he still thinks the project should be smaller, but he hasn't come up with any guidelines, at least not for public consumption, since he first acknowledged the need to downscale the project at a September 19 candidates' forum. Still, a 15% cut wouldn't return the project even to its starting place. So some perspective surely would help, as well as an acknowledgement--as City Councilman David Yassky and Assemblyman Jim Brennan have observed--that the planning process has been faulty.
So I mentioned to Marty that people were troubled by the undemocratic process behind the Atlantic Yards plan. "The people spoke last Tuesday," he declared, indicating (I suppose) that the reelection of him and Mayor Bloomberg represented an implicit endorsement of Atlantic Yards.
I asked if he was troubled by the tradeoff from office space (promises of jobs) to housing in the proposed project, as noted in a recent New York Times article. "The people of Brooklyn wanted more housing," he replied. Actually, in that same Times article, Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey acknowledged that the company needed to build more market-rate housing to pay for the affordable housing.
The people of Brooklyn? Was there a plebiscite? Stuckey told City Council last May, as noted in Chapter 1 of my report, that he had been "educated" by housing advocates (including ACORN) that "there is a dire need for residential development in New York City." So the developer then added 2,800 market-rate condos, with a possible 600-1,000 "affordable" condos to be built on or off site, geared to families in the "upper affordable income tiers," including some earning six figures. That's hardly ACORN's constituency. Given the $1.1 billion in public costs over 30 years acknowledged by Stuckey, shouldn't there be more discussion about whether luxury housing should be subsidized?
Marty said that the scale of the project might change, "but the arena is nonnegotiable." (Remember, Marty's goal has been to bring major league sports back to Brooklyn.) What about putting it Coney Island, a site he once supported? He said the transportation wasn't sufficient. Perhaps, though there's an argument that it's easier to empty out an arena into subways at the end of the line. More importantly, only now--after the project is well into the approval process--is the question of the project's transportation impact being discussed.
At a forum on Wednesday, Daniel Goldstein of Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB) mentioned a February 2004 meeting that community advocates had with representatives of Markowitz's office, Forest City Ratner, and architect Frank Gehry. As later reported by the Brooklyn Papers, a local architect suggested that Ratner tear down the much-criticized Atlantic Center mall and build the arena bridging Atlantic Avenue, thus avoiding eminent domain and the condemnation of private property. The developer cited security concerns. This past August, an unreleased Memorandum of Understanding dated Feb. 18, 2005 obtained by DDDB showed that Forest City Ratner may build up to 875,000 square feet of commercial office space and 711,000 feet of residential space on the Atlantic Center site. (It's unclear whether that would replace the mall or simply be placed on top of the mall.)
I told Marty that some people were skeptical about the developer. "There is no more socially conscious developer than Bruce Ratner," the borough president replied, quoting, uh, himself at the press conference regarding the affordable housing plan at Atlantic Yards. Is it socially conscious to rely on government subsidies and to impose gag orders (see Chapter 7 of my report) on those who sell property to the developer?
More crucially, when I mentioned to Marty that the developer had added market-rate housing to skew the 50 percent affordable housing promise, he barked back, "50 percent of the rentals." True, that is the letter of the housing Memorandum of Understanding but not the spirit: when the housing deal was announced, Marty and the press described it as 50 percent of all apartments at Atlantic Yards. At the time, Marty cited a "commitment to build a full 50 percent of Atlantic Yards housing as affordable." A week after that, as I've noted, the developer announced plans for the new condos.
Thursday, November 17, 2005
Dispiriting debates: false premises (on eminent domain) and half-loaves (regarding the CBA)
On November 16, two forums featuring supporters and opponents of the Atlantic Yards plan showed the dispiriting divide that has emerged regarding this project. It's difficult to have a debate, the forums suggested, when there are such fundamental differences, in one case over the facts of the project, in another over the appropriate posture toward a powerful developer.
On eminent domain and more
(NOTE: Errol Louis sent me a followup note about my blog post: Rather than parse your highly misleading account of the recent forum at Brooklyn Law School, I am sending you a link to the taped event, so that readers can make up their own minds about was or wasn't said: mms://advisor.brooklaw.edu/sparerkelo05.wmv.)
A lunchtime forum at Brooklyn Law School featured Daily News editorial board member Errol Louis (a BLS graduate) and Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn spokesperson Daniel Goldstein. The subject was eminent domain, the Supreme Court's Kelo decision, and its effects on Brooklyn. (Note that the Daily News already published a snide, error-filled editorial criticizing those who voiced concerns at the mandated hearing on environmental impact.)
Louis cited crime and poverty statistics for the general area around the site, saying "it has changed all too slowly and all too little," which disregards some of the gentrification in process. (That's not to say that gentrification solves social problems, simply to point out that Prospect Heights has been booming.) He cited Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent in Kelo, suggesting that the conditions in Prospect Heights were analogous to the two cases she cited as legitimate examples of eminent domain, in which blight and oligopoly were removed.
However, the area of Prospect Heights in and around the Atlantic Yards plan is not so recognizable in O'Connor's opinion:
We are guided by two precedents about the taking of real property by eminent domain. In Berman, we upheld takings within a blighted neighborhood of Washington, D. C. The neighborhood had so deteriorated that, for example, 64.3% of its dwellings were beyond repair...In Midkiff, we upheld a land condemnation scheme in Hawaii whereby title in real property was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. At that time, the State and Federal Governments owned nearly 49% of the State’s land, and another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners...
The Court’s holdings in Berman and Midkiff were true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause. In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society–in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm... Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use.
The level of blight, in its colloquial sense at least, is quite irregular in Prospect Heights--witness the expensive renovations of formerly dormant industrial structures. There has never been an oligopolist--until Forest City Ratner began buying up the neighborhood. And, perhaps most importantly, no legislative body has deliberated regarding the appropriate use of eminent domain, even if the mayor and governor have signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the project.
Worse, Louis kept talking about how the railyard owned by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority has been undeveloped for 50 years. That's true, but not an issue for eminent domain--such development would simply require an RFP and a bidding process, which is what took place earlier this year, however skewed to Ratner. Then Louis claimed "an estimate of 15,000 permanent jobs" at Atlantic Yards.
Goldstein, given a chance to respond, pointed out that the railyard was not subject to eminent domain, and it could and should be developed--and that the area could be developed even faster thanks to rezoning. He added that there might be 15,000 construction jobs--meaning 1,500 a year for ten years--and far fewer than 15,000 permanent jobs--an original promise of 10,000, now perhaps space for 2,300 office jobs, of which 700 might be new. Goldstein also suggested that the process--the avoidance of the city's land use rules, which require public hearings--was the biggest problems.
So where did Louis get his figures regarding jobs? He sent listeners to the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce site, saying that "most of the 30,000 jobs come from Atlantic Yards." Actually, the Chamber's May 2004 Brooklyn Labor Market Review cites (p. 8) "over 30,000 jobs being generated by significant economic development projects such as store openings, which include Target, Ikea and Fairway" and "the proposed Downtown Brooklyn Plan, which involves creating over 18,000 jobs in industries such as Finance & Insurance, Banking, Information, Legal Services and Retail over the next five to ten years." And what of those 18,000 jobs? On p. 43, it states of Atlantic Yards: "It is estimated that the development will create approximately 10,000 permanent jobs at the arena and the office towers." And, as noted, that 10,000 figure has been discredited.
Goldstein also pointed out that, in the Kelo case, the city of New London did a thorough report that the neighborhood needed redevelopment, and put out the property for bid: "Justice [Anthony] Kennedy said that, when there was no legislative planning process and a favored developer, that would be a violation [of the Constitution]."
Indeed, Kennedy's concurrence suggests Atlantic Yards critics may have a legal case against the project:
There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause....
This is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard, but it is appropriate to underscore aspects of the instant case that convince me no departure from Berman and Midkiff is appropriate here. This taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive development plan meant to address a serious city-wide depression, and the projected economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimus. The identity of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans. The city complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes. In sum, while there may be categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an impermissible private purpose, no such circumstances are present in this case.
Another dispiriting failure to establish shared premises: Louis said the majority of the land in the Atlantic Yards plan is state-owned, a defense for bypassing city land use review rules. Goldstein responded that, no, "it's eight of 22 acres" (actually 8.5).
Louis called the Community Benefits Agreement "an extraordinary CBA," citing provisions for hiring minority and women workers and subcontractors, and provisions holding the developer liable if the targets aren't met. (There's ample testimony that this CBA is not legitimate.) "For the developer to have the lead here, after the city and state sat around, to me it's not all that troubling," Louis said.
Goldstein responded, "The developer should not decide the future when there are public dollars and public land involved." He noted that there's no legislative body involved, except the state Public Authorities Control Board, which would decide on state subsidies.
On the Community Benefits Agreement
A forum at the Fordham Law School featured a larger panel, with Goldstein of DDDB and Eric McClure of Park Slope Neighbors representing Atlantic Yards critics, and Charlene Nimmons of Public Housing Communities and Darnell Canada of Rebuild representing Atlantic Yards supporters. While at the earlier forum, there was a racial divide but not a class divide (Louis is black, Goldstein white, but Louis is a lawyer), here there were both divides: Nimmons and Canada are black and spoke the language of grassroots empowerment, while Goldstein and McClure are white emphasized the lack of a fair process.
The issues of race and class are far more complex--there are notable black elected officials opposing the project, such as City Councilwoman Letitia James and State Senator Velmanette Montgomery--but, as law professor Brian Glick put it, the community groups supporting the plan are from more outlying areas, largely working class and communities of color, while those opposing it are from closer to the project footprint and more middle-class and white.
Nimmons, who pointed out that some public housing residents live right across the street from the project footprint, cited "the importance of looking for opportunities" and how "we're now on the inside looking out." Her group is a signatory to the Community Benefits Agreement. Canada, who is not a signatory but whose group (assisting former prisoners) is a beneficiary of the CBA, said he supported the project because it would bring jobs to an economically depressed area (he cited "71-72% unemployment," a statistic that may have come from James Caldwell's numbers regarding public housing). "I support the project because this is a new way to help communities grow," he said.
Left unsaid were how many jobs would actually be created--as well as how much it would cost to create each job. The project, billed as "Jobs, Housing, and Hoops" is mostly luxury housing. Yes, jobs are created by housing construction, but they don't necessarily justify a $1.1 billion (estimate by Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey; see my report) public investment over 30 years.
McClure said Park Slope Neighbors supports development--the railyard is a "scar"--and suggested that affordable housing be mandated through zoning rather than relying on incentives. "We're support transparency and openness, which are more or less absent in this project." Goldstein said DDDB also supports jobs and "truly affordable housing. Where we differ is how it's done."
"it's a false debate: Ratner or nothing," Goldstein observed. He noted that the CBA regarding the Staples Center in Los Angeles involved 25 organizations, groups that were opposed to the project or troubled by the project, unlike the Atlantic Yards CBA, where the groups involved supported it from the beginning. He suggested that, in this situation, the city and MTA should have met with the community and put out an RFP for development. "Here, the developer proposed it and framed it."
Canada, who made a distinction between two kinds of people--John F. Kennedy and racist Birmingham police chief Bull Connor--said he looked upon developer Bruce Ratner "as a JFK." He acknowledged, "It's not the best CBA we could have, but it's the first. It's one we can work with." Earlier, Nimmons had said, "We're in support with some concerns."
McClure commented on how the threat of eminent domain is forcing out homeowners and suggested that the premise that eminent domain could increase tax yields could lead any residential property to be replaced by a higher-yielding McDonalds or big box store.
Nimmons observed, "When you know condemnation is prevalent, you don't take residency in such property." She also criticized public officials who support the Downtown Brooklyn Plan, which includes eminent domain, for opposing Atlantic Yards. (The former, however, emerged from a city process.)
Was this forum an example of a tactical shift, as Lumi Rolley observes on NoLandGrab, in which project supporters say they have concerns about the CBA or didn't initially support it? Possibly. But the two most prominent supporters of the CBA would have trouble distancing themselves from developer Forest City Ratner. ACORN is contractually obligated "to take reasonable steps to publicly support the project." And BUILD has received money from the developer even while denying it.
On eminent domain and more
(NOTE: Errol Louis sent me a followup note about my blog post: Rather than parse your highly misleading account of the recent forum at Brooklyn Law School, I am sending you a link to the taped event, so that readers can make up their own minds about was or wasn't said: mms://advisor.brooklaw.edu/sparerkelo05.wmv.)
A lunchtime forum at Brooklyn Law School featured Daily News editorial board member Errol Louis (a BLS graduate) and Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn spokesperson Daniel Goldstein. The subject was eminent domain, the Supreme Court's Kelo decision, and its effects on Brooklyn. (Note that the Daily News already published a snide, error-filled editorial criticizing those who voiced concerns at the mandated hearing on environmental impact.)
Louis cited crime and poverty statistics for the general area around the site, saying "it has changed all too slowly and all too little," which disregards some of the gentrification in process. (That's not to say that gentrification solves social problems, simply to point out that Prospect Heights has been booming.) He cited Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent in Kelo, suggesting that the conditions in Prospect Heights were analogous to the two cases she cited as legitimate examples of eminent domain, in which blight and oligopoly were removed.
However, the area of Prospect Heights in and around the Atlantic Yards plan is not so recognizable in O'Connor's opinion:
We are guided by two precedents about the taking of real property by eminent domain. In Berman, we upheld takings within a blighted neighborhood of Washington, D. C. The neighborhood had so deteriorated that, for example, 64.3% of its dwellings were beyond repair...In Midkiff, we upheld a land condemnation scheme in Hawaii whereby title in real property was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. At that time, the State and Federal Governments owned nearly 49% of the State’s land, and another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners...
The Court’s holdings in Berman and Midkiff were true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause. In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society–in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm... Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use.
The level of blight, in its colloquial sense at least, is quite irregular in Prospect Heights--witness the expensive renovations of formerly dormant industrial structures. There has never been an oligopolist--until Forest City Ratner began buying up the neighborhood. And, perhaps most importantly, no legislative body has deliberated regarding the appropriate use of eminent domain, even if the mayor and governor have signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the project.
Worse, Louis kept talking about how the railyard owned by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority has been undeveloped for 50 years. That's true, but not an issue for eminent domain--such development would simply require an RFP and a bidding process, which is what took place earlier this year, however skewed to Ratner. Then Louis claimed "an estimate of 15,000 permanent jobs" at Atlantic Yards.
Goldstein, given a chance to respond, pointed out that the railyard was not subject to eminent domain, and it could and should be developed--and that the area could be developed even faster thanks to rezoning. He added that there might be 15,000 construction jobs--meaning 1,500 a year for ten years--and far fewer than 15,000 permanent jobs--an original promise of 10,000, now perhaps space for 2,300 office jobs, of which 700 might be new. Goldstein also suggested that the process--the avoidance of the city's land use rules, which require public hearings--was the biggest problems.
So where did Louis get his figures regarding jobs? He sent listeners to the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce site, saying that "most of the 30,000 jobs come from Atlantic Yards." Actually, the Chamber's May 2004 Brooklyn Labor Market Review cites (p. 8) "over 30,000 jobs being generated by significant economic development projects such as store openings, which include Target, Ikea and Fairway" and "the proposed Downtown Brooklyn Plan, which involves creating over 18,000 jobs in industries such as Finance & Insurance, Banking, Information, Legal Services and Retail over the next five to ten years." And what of those 18,000 jobs? On p. 43, it states of Atlantic Yards: "It is estimated that the development will create approximately 10,000 permanent jobs at the arena and the office towers." And, as noted, that 10,000 figure has been discredited.
Goldstein also pointed out that, in the Kelo case, the city of New London did a thorough report that the neighborhood needed redevelopment, and put out the property for bid: "Justice [Anthony] Kennedy said that, when there was no legislative planning process and a favored developer, that would be a violation [of the Constitution]."
Indeed, Kennedy's concurrence suggests Atlantic Yards critics may have a legal case against the project:
There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause....
This is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard, but it is appropriate to underscore aspects of the instant case that convince me no departure from Berman and Midkiff is appropriate here. This taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive development plan meant to address a serious city-wide depression, and the projected economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimus. The identity of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans. The city complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes. In sum, while there may be categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an impermissible private purpose, no such circumstances are present in this case.
Another dispiriting failure to establish shared premises: Louis said the majority of the land in the Atlantic Yards plan is state-owned, a defense for bypassing city land use review rules. Goldstein responded that, no, "it's eight of 22 acres" (actually 8.5).
Louis called the Community Benefits Agreement "an extraordinary CBA," citing provisions for hiring minority and women workers and subcontractors, and provisions holding the developer liable if the targets aren't met. (There's ample testimony that this CBA is not legitimate.) "For the developer to have the lead here, after the city and state sat around, to me it's not all that troubling," Louis said.
Goldstein responded, "The developer should not decide the future when there are public dollars and public land involved." He noted that there's no legislative body involved, except the state Public Authorities Control Board, which would decide on state subsidies.
On the Community Benefits Agreement
A forum at the Fordham Law School featured a larger panel, with Goldstein of DDDB and Eric McClure of Park Slope Neighbors representing Atlantic Yards critics, and Charlene Nimmons of Public Housing Communities and Darnell Canada of Rebuild representing Atlantic Yards supporters. While at the earlier forum, there was a racial divide but not a class divide (Louis is black, Goldstein white, but Louis is a lawyer), here there were both divides: Nimmons and Canada are black and spoke the language of grassroots empowerment, while Goldstein and McClure are white emphasized the lack of a fair process.
The issues of race and class are far more complex--there are notable black elected officials opposing the project, such as City Councilwoman Letitia James and State Senator Velmanette Montgomery--but, as law professor Brian Glick put it, the community groups supporting the plan are from more outlying areas, largely working class and communities of color, while those opposing it are from closer to the project footprint and more middle-class and white.
Nimmons, who pointed out that some public housing residents live right across the street from the project footprint, cited "the importance of looking for opportunities" and how "we're now on the inside looking out." Her group is a signatory to the Community Benefits Agreement. Canada, who is not a signatory but whose group (assisting former prisoners) is a beneficiary of the CBA, said he supported the project because it would bring jobs to an economically depressed area (he cited "71-72% unemployment," a statistic that may have come from James Caldwell's numbers regarding public housing). "I support the project because this is a new way to help communities grow," he said.
Left unsaid were how many jobs would actually be created--as well as how much it would cost to create each job. The project, billed as "Jobs, Housing, and Hoops" is mostly luxury housing. Yes, jobs are created by housing construction, but they don't necessarily justify a $1.1 billion (estimate by Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey; see my report) public investment over 30 years.
McClure said Park Slope Neighbors supports development--the railyard is a "scar"--and suggested that affordable housing be mandated through zoning rather than relying on incentives. "We're support transparency and openness, which are more or less absent in this project." Goldstein said DDDB also supports jobs and "truly affordable housing. Where we differ is how it's done."
"it's a false debate: Ratner or nothing," Goldstein observed. He noted that the CBA regarding the Staples Center in Los Angeles involved 25 organizations, groups that were opposed to the project or troubled by the project, unlike the Atlantic Yards CBA, where the groups involved supported it from the beginning. He suggested that, in this situation, the city and MTA should have met with the community and put out an RFP for development. "Here, the developer proposed it and framed it."
Canada, who made a distinction between two kinds of people--John F. Kennedy and racist Birmingham police chief Bull Connor--said he looked upon developer Bruce Ratner "as a JFK." He acknowledged, "It's not the best CBA we could have, but it's the first. It's one we can work with." Earlier, Nimmons had said, "We're in support with some concerns."
McClure commented on how the threat of eminent domain is forcing out homeowners and suggested that the premise that eminent domain could increase tax yields could lead any residential property to be replaced by a higher-yielding McDonalds or big box store.
Nimmons observed, "When you know condemnation is prevalent, you don't take residency in such property." She also criticized public officials who support the Downtown Brooklyn Plan, which includes eminent domain, for opposing Atlantic Yards. (The former, however, emerged from a city process.)
Was this forum an example of a tactical shift, as Lumi Rolley observes on NoLandGrab, in which project supporters say they have concerns about the CBA or didn't initially support it? Possibly. But the two most prominent supporters of the CBA would have trouble distancing themselves from developer Forest City Ratner. ACORN is contractually obligated "to take reasonable steps to publicly support the project." And BUILD has received money from the developer even while denying it.
Sunday, November 13, 2005
Finally, an Atlantic Yards op-ed from the Times: critical, but hardly coherent
So, 23 months after Forest City Ratner officially announced its Atlantic Yards plan, and some 28 months after discussion began in the press, the New York Times on 11/13/05 finally ran an op-ed piece about it, headlined The Project That Ate Brooklyn. The contributor John B. Manbeck is identified as "a former Brooklyn borough historian." The bio box doesn't mention that he has written (noncontroversial) historical articles for both issues of Forest City Ratner's Brooklyn Standard p.r. sheet.
Manbeck's critical take on the project, calling the subsidies a "misuse of public funds," likely won't be welcomed by the developer, but at the same time he misreads critics, calling them NIMBYs, and, while criticizing the approval process, basically throws up his hands. See further analysis at NoLandGrab and Manbeck's semi-explanations at the New York Observer's The Real Estate. Note that the editorial was commissioned "a couple of months ago" but ran the Sunday after the election, so it had no effect on the mayoral debate.
Note: the op-ed appears in the City Weekly section, which is part of the Times issued only in the five boroughs. Those outside city limits--the suburbs of Long Island, Westchester, New Jersey, and Connecticut--get their own weekly edition, and the City Weekly obviously doesn't appear in the national edition. Thus, debate about this project is limited. I note in Chapter 13 of my report that op-eds and editorials about this enormous project should appear in the main editorial section. Also note that the op-ed appeared after, rather than before, the mayoral election in which incumbent Mike Bloomberg and challenger Freddy Ferrer differed significantly on the project.
Manbeck sets up his point:
But just as we'll always have developers, community activists and environmentalists will invariably seek to check their greed and broaden their foresight. The tension between these two groups can be a creative one - except when it leads developers to exaggerate their ambitions and activists to simply obstruct them.
That's where we are with Forest City Ratner Companies' plan to build a sports arena surrounded by 17 imposing high-rise buildings on the Atlantic Avenue railyards. The plan is overkill, for which public officials are partly to blame. But the community's response to it - a mix of not-in-my-backyard rejection and idealized nostalgia - is overkill as well.
First, it's 16 buildings, not 17--a mistake several writers have made (including me). More importantly, the project would not be "on the Atlantic Avenue railyards." The railyard would represent 8.3 (or, to some sources, 8.5) acres of a 22-acre site. The Times's then-architecture critic, Herbert Muschamp, made this mistake in his initial 12/11/03 assessment ("It is now an open railyard") and now Manbeck makes it again. Why can't the Times get this right after two years?
Worse, Manbeck does not identify the NIMBY rejection and "idealized nostalgia." After all, the leader of the opposing coalition is called Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn, and it was DDDB that helped sponsor the UNITY plan for developing the railyard and also found Extell Development Co. to bid on the railyard after the Metropolitan Transportation Authority belatedly opened it up for bidding. Remember, Extell outbid Forest City Ratner, but the MTA still took FCR's bid.
As for "idealized nostalgia," it's Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz, who solicited Bruce Ratner to buy the Nets and bring them to Brooklyn, who regularly invokes how the Brooklyn Dodgers 50 years ago brought the borough together. See his most recent State of the Borough address:
Meanwhile, new residents, businesses, and cultural institutions — not to mention the upcoming arrival of the NBA’s Brooklyn Nets — are increasingly making Brooklyn a true land of opportunity.
Now, I fought hard to get a national sports team to call Brooklyn home.
I know of three things that bring people together like nothing else — music, religion, and sports.
As a boy, I’m happy to say that I was able to watch the Brooklyn Dodgers play every summer, just a few blocks from where I lived.
Manbeck continues:
This arena proposal makes good sense. The neighborhood's residents fear a traffic snarl, but with 10 subway lines and the Long Island Rail Road serving Atlantic Avenue station, that's unlikely to be a problem. And the arena would stimulate construction on Boerum Hill's vacant lots while helping to increase ridership on the underused Flatbush branch of the L.I.R.R.
The author betrays some stunning naivete. There was never a proposal for just an arena; announcing the project, Bruce Ratner told the New York Times (12/11/03), "This started with basketball... But it became clear it was not economically viable without a real estate component." Thus residents fearing increased traffic have based their concerns on the project as a whole. The Daily News reported, a 2/29/04 article headlined Arena concerns hit home:
Basketball games will generate a fraction of the traffic compared to Ratner's nearly 7 million square feet of planned residential and office space..."
Manbeck continues:
But the Atlantic Yards proposal doesn't stop with the Nets. The 14-million-square-foot project includes a 620-foot-high office building, taller than the neighborhood's landmark, the 512-foot-high Williamsburgh Savings Bank. The proposal replaces 162 dwellings with 8,300 new units, 40 percent of which will be allocated to low- and middle-income housing. The influx of new residents will swiftly overload the neighborhood's social services and commercial amenities, and the project's footprint will encroach on historic neighborhoods like Prospect Heights.
Hm, 14 million square feet? I thought it was just over 9 million. As for the residential units, there would be, at most, 7,300 at the project site, and 600 to 1,000 condos built offsite. Only if the full 1,000 offsite condos were built would the 40% mark be reached and, as I've noted, relatively few of the units would be truly affordable.
Manback then makes a point about the total project cost:
Still more disturbing than the scale of the project is the active support that Forest City Ratner, a private company, has received from the borough, city and state governments. All told, Forest City Ratner's Brooklyn plan will cost the public $1 billion in tax breaks, subsidies and noncompetitive bidding. (Forest City Ratner is also the development partner for the new headquarters that The New York Times Company is building in Manhattan with the help of $26.1 million in tax breaks.)
The idea behind such generous infusions of public money into private enterprise, presumably, is that the returns will benefit government as well as the developer. But quite apart from being a misuse of public funds, a project that relies heavily on subsidies rarely works. If anything, the very fact that a developer can't make a project float on its own should signal that something is wrong with its scale.
A misuse of public funds--that's a serious accusation, and one that should have entered the debate two years ago. Note that the direct subsidies are for the arena, and many of the indirect subsidies for the rest of the project.
Note that Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey identified a total public cost over 30 years at $1.1 billion; other analyses suggest it could be even more. Manbeck here presents an apples-and-oranges situation when comparing the Atlantic Yards and Times Tower project. Atlantic Yards supporters could say that they would receive only $200 million in direct subsidies; the rest of the monies would be indirect subsidies. As for the Times Tower, the total public cost would be more than Manbeck acknowledges. The Village Voice reported last August:
The deal calls for the Times to get $26.1 million in tax breaks, but the real price for the public depends on the additional cost for the land.
That could add another $79 million.
Manbeck then offers some general guidelines for development:
There is a responsible role for government to play in urban development, and it isn't the role of share-holder. Rather, the city should provide oversight, offer input and, if necessary, exert control over such projects to prevent overbuilding, particularly in areas where growth is as vibrant as it is in Brooklyn.
Officials need to consider the existing profiles of neighborhoods as well as the immediate goals of developers.
There are plenty of good precedents to look to. The developer Greg O'Connell created an environmentally friendly Red Hook waterfront where once there was simply blight. In Dumbo, David Walentas reconfigured vacant factories and storage spaces to create housing. The city's planning commission needs to hold developers' feet to the fire, to make sure that they are always aware of the responsibility they bear to the city.
Implicit yet unstated is the huge difference between the above projects and Atlantic Yards. The city has allowed the Atlantic Yards project to completely bypass the city's land use review process, ULURP; it will be managed by the state. Also, neither of the above projects required eminent domain, and they proceeded in large part as renovations of existing buildings, not new construction.
Manbeck continues:
Brooklyn's developers have a habit of submitting audacious initial proposals. That way, when the public balks, as it inevitably does at new development, the developer can retreat to a more conservative plan that satisfies his true ambitions while allowing the public to feel that it has staved off disaster. When Brooklyn Law School faced community resistance to its proposal for an oversized dormitory building, the developer pulled back and compromised.
There's a huge difference, however, between scaling back one building, and scaling back a project with 17 buildings. What's the proper balance between the "overkill" Manbeck identifies on both sides? Nine buildings? Maybe we must first agree on basic principles, like whether the project is "on the Atlantic Avenue railyards" or not. Ratner's plan would cover an area nearly three times the size of the railyard; the plan by Extell (or another plan just based on the railyard) would not.
Note that state Assemblyman Roger Green, who first floated the idea of moving affordable rentals offsite to reduce project density, in today's New York Daily News suggested moving both types of housing:
Green is proposing to move up to a third of the residential units - a mix of market-rate and affordable apartments - in the area between rapidly gentrifying Prospect Heights and Crown Heights.
Note that one-third of 7,300 units would be 2,433 units, leaving 4,867 units--still more than the original 4,500 units, though, due to the current planned reduction in office space, probably resulting in a project somewhat smaller than the original 7.7 million square feet proposed.
Here's Manbeck's conclusion:
Now Forest City Ratner has revised its plan, but the size has jumped and the costs escalated. Too bad the company did not instead retreat to a place that balances a forward-looking vision with respect for Brooklyn's heritage.
Now? Forest City Ratner revised its plan at the 5/26/05 City Council hearing, announcing up to 2,800 additional luxury condos, and in mid-September confirmed it when the ESDC released a project outline. And can Forest City Ratner retreat? Sure, it could downsize a project that has grown significantly and changed character. But it never was going to propose just an arena, and its plan has always relied on eminent domain for properties in the non-railyard component of the footprint.
So, what next? Will another op-ed or editorial urge the environmental impact statement to address the scale? Will a commentator urge the state Public Authorities Control Board, which still must sign off on the state subsidies, to withhold the subsidies? Will the New York Times soon print editorials from known supporters and opponents of the plan? How about Assemblyman Roger Green vs. City Councilwoman Letitia James?
One more thing: the "pull quote" for the article says "A stadium for the Nets is a good idea. But 17 high rises?" Again, a press outlet confuses an arena with a stadium.
Manbeck's critical take on the project, calling the subsidies a "misuse of public funds," likely won't be welcomed by the developer, but at the same time he misreads critics, calling them NIMBYs, and, while criticizing the approval process, basically throws up his hands. See further analysis at NoLandGrab and Manbeck's semi-explanations at the New York Observer's The Real Estate. Note that the editorial was commissioned "a couple of months ago" but ran the Sunday after the election, so it had no effect on the mayoral debate.
Note: the op-ed appears in the City Weekly section, which is part of the Times issued only in the five boroughs. Those outside city limits--the suburbs of Long Island, Westchester, New Jersey, and Connecticut--get their own weekly edition, and the City Weekly obviously doesn't appear in the national edition. Thus, debate about this project is limited. I note in Chapter 13 of my report that op-eds and editorials about this enormous project should appear in the main editorial section. Also note that the op-ed appeared after, rather than before, the mayoral election in which incumbent Mike Bloomberg and challenger Freddy Ferrer differed significantly on the project.
Manbeck sets up his point:
But just as we'll always have developers, community activists and environmentalists will invariably seek to check their greed and broaden their foresight. The tension between these two groups can be a creative one - except when it leads developers to exaggerate their ambitions and activists to simply obstruct them.
That's where we are with Forest City Ratner Companies' plan to build a sports arena surrounded by 17 imposing high-rise buildings on the Atlantic Avenue railyards. The plan is overkill, for which public officials are partly to blame. But the community's response to it - a mix of not-in-my-backyard rejection and idealized nostalgia - is overkill as well.
First, it's 16 buildings, not 17--a mistake several writers have made (including me). More importantly, the project would not be "on the Atlantic Avenue railyards." The railyard would represent 8.3 (or, to some sources, 8.5) acres of a 22-acre site. The Times's then-architecture critic, Herbert Muschamp, made this mistake in his initial 12/11/03 assessment ("It is now an open railyard") and now Manbeck makes it again. Why can't the Times get this right after two years?
Worse, Manbeck does not identify the NIMBY rejection and "idealized nostalgia." After all, the leader of the opposing coalition is called Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn, and it was DDDB that helped sponsor the UNITY plan for developing the railyard and also found Extell Development Co. to bid on the railyard after the Metropolitan Transportation Authority belatedly opened it up for bidding. Remember, Extell outbid Forest City Ratner, but the MTA still took FCR's bid.
As for "idealized nostalgia," it's Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz, who solicited Bruce Ratner to buy the Nets and bring them to Brooklyn, who regularly invokes how the Brooklyn Dodgers 50 years ago brought the borough together. See his most recent State of the Borough address:
Meanwhile, new residents, businesses, and cultural institutions — not to mention the upcoming arrival of the NBA’s Brooklyn Nets — are increasingly making Brooklyn a true land of opportunity.
Now, I fought hard to get a national sports team to call Brooklyn home.
I know of three things that bring people together like nothing else — music, religion, and sports.
As a boy, I’m happy to say that I was able to watch the Brooklyn Dodgers play every summer, just a few blocks from where I lived.
Manbeck continues:
This arena proposal makes good sense. The neighborhood's residents fear a traffic snarl, but with 10 subway lines and the Long Island Rail Road serving Atlantic Avenue station, that's unlikely to be a problem. And the arena would stimulate construction on Boerum Hill's vacant lots while helping to increase ridership on the underused Flatbush branch of the L.I.R.R.
The author betrays some stunning naivete. There was never a proposal for just an arena; announcing the project, Bruce Ratner told the New York Times (12/11/03), "This started with basketball... But it became clear it was not economically viable without a real estate component." Thus residents fearing increased traffic have based their concerns on the project as a whole. The Daily News reported, a 2/29/04 article headlined Arena concerns hit home:
Basketball games will generate a fraction of the traffic compared to Ratner's nearly 7 million square feet of planned residential and office space..."
Manbeck continues:
But the Atlantic Yards proposal doesn't stop with the Nets. The 14-million-square-foot project includes a 620-foot-high office building, taller than the neighborhood's landmark, the 512-foot-high Williamsburgh Savings Bank. The proposal replaces 162 dwellings with 8,300 new units, 40 percent of which will be allocated to low- and middle-income housing. The influx of new residents will swiftly overload the neighborhood's social services and commercial amenities, and the project's footprint will encroach on historic neighborhoods like Prospect Heights.
Hm, 14 million square feet? I thought it was just over 9 million. As for the residential units, there would be, at most, 7,300 at the project site, and 600 to 1,000 condos built offsite. Only if the full 1,000 offsite condos were built would the 40% mark be reached and, as I've noted, relatively few of the units would be truly affordable.
Manback then makes a point about the total project cost:
Still more disturbing than the scale of the project is the active support that Forest City Ratner, a private company, has received from the borough, city and state governments. All told, Forest City Ratner's Brooklyn plan will cost the public $1 billion in tax breaks, subsidies and noncompetitive bidding. (Forest City Ratner is also the development partner for the new headquarters that The New York Times Company is building in Manhattan with the help of $26.1 million in tax breaks.)
The idea behind such generous infusions of public money into private enterprise, presumably, is that the returns will benefit government as well as the developer. But quite apart from being a misuse of public funds, a project that relies heavily on subsidies rarely works. If anything, the very fact that a developer can't make a project float on its own should signal that something is wrong with its scale.
A misuse of public funds--that's a serious accusation, and one that should have entered the debate two years ago. Note that the direct subsidies are for the arena, and many of the indirect subsidies for the rest of the project.
Note that Forest City Ratner's Jim Stuckey identified a total public cost over 30 years at $1.1 billion; other analyses suggest it could be even more. Manbeck here presents an apples-and-oranges situation when comparing the Atlantic Yards and Times Tower project. Atlantic Yards supporters could say that they would receive only $200 million in direct subsidies; the rest of the monies would be indirect subsidies. As for the Times Tower, the total public cost would be more than Manbeck acknowledges. The Village Voice reported last August:
The deal calls for the Times to get $26.1 million in tax breaks, but the real price for the public depends on the additional cost for the land.
That could add another $79 million.
Manbeck then offers some general guidelines for development:
There is a responsible role for government to play in urban development, and it isn't the role of share-holder. Rather, the city should provide oversight, offer input and, if necessary, exert control over such projects to prevent overbuilding, particularly in areas where growth is as vibrant as it is in Brooklyn.
Officials need to consider the existing profiles of neighborhoods as well as the immediate goals of developers.
There are plenty of good precedents to look to. The developer Greg O'Connell created an environmentally friendly Red Hook waterfront where once there was simply blight. In Dumbo, David Walentas reconfigured vacant factories and storage spaces to create housing. The city's planning commission needs to hold developers' feet to the fire, to make sure that they are always aware of the responsibility they bear to the city.
Implicit yet unstated is the huge difference between the above projects and Atlantic Yards. The city has allowed the Atlantic Yards project to completely bypass the city's land use review process, ULURP; it will be managed by the state. Also, neither of the above projects required eminent domain, and they proceeded in large part as renovations of existing buildings, not new construction.
Manbeck continues:
Brooklyn's developers have a habit of submitting audacious initial proposals. That way, when the public balks, as it inevitably does at new development, the developer can retreat to a more conservative plan that satisfies his true ambitions while allowing the public to feel that it has staved off disaster. When Brooklyn Law School faced community resistance to its proposal for an oversized dormitory building, the developer pulled back and compromised.
There's a huge difference, however, between scaling back one building, and scaling back a project with 17 buildings. What's the proper balance between the "overkill" Manbeck identifies on both sides? Nine buildings? Maybe we must first agree on basic principles, like whether the project is "on the Atlantic Avenue railyards" or not. Ratner's plan would cover an area nearly three times the size of the railyard; the plan by Extell (or another plan just based on the railyard) would not.
Note that state Assemblyman Roger Green, who first floated the idea of moving affordable rentals offsite to reduce project density, in today's New York Daily News suggested moving both types of housing:
Green is proposing to move up to a third of the residential units - a mix of market-rate and affordable apartments - in the area between rapidly gentrifying Prospect Heights and Crown Heights.
Note that one-third of 7,300 units would be 2,433 units, leaving 4,867 units--still more than the original 4,500 units, though, due to the current planned reduction in office space, probably resulting in a project somewhat smaller than the original 7.7 million square feet proposed.
Here's Manbeck's conclusion:
Now Forest City Ratner has revised its plan, but the size has jumped and the costs escalated. Too bad the company did not instead retreat to a place that balances a forward-looking vision with respect for Brooklyn's heritage.
Now? Forest City Ratner revised its plan at the 5/26/05 City Council hearing, announcing up to 2,800 additional luxury condos, and in mid-September confirmed it when the ESDC released a project outline. And can Forest City Ratner retreat? Sure, it could downsize a project that has grown significantly and changed character. But it never was going to propose just an arena, and its plan has always relied on eminent domain for properties in the non-railyard component of the footprint.
So, what next? Will another op-ed or editorial urge the environmental impact statement to address the scale? Will a commentator urge the state Public Authorities Control Board, which still must sign off on the state subsidies, to withhold the subsidies? Will the New York Times soon print editorials from known supporters and opponents of the plan? How about Assemblyman Roger Green vs. City Councilwoman Letitia James?
One more thing: the "pull quote" for the article says "A stadium for the Nets is a good idea. But 17 high rises?" Again, a press outlet confuses an arena with a stadium.
Friday, November 11, 2005
No blight: Does Roger Green's statement hinder Ratner's plans?
If you walk around the non-railyard component of the Atlantic Yards footprint, you'd see a mix of buildings: some restored into luxury housing, some extant row houses, some industrial and commercial buildings still operating, and several that are grungy or completely moribund. It's not all pretty, but the trend has been upward, an indication of progress. But if Forest City Ratner wants the land, and some property owners won't sell, the state may have to determine that it's "blighted," an enormously vague term.
At a legislative hearing November 5, state Assemblyman Roger Green, a project supporter who represents the area, declared that it is not, in fact, blighted.
In a Brooklyn Papers article headlined Atlantic Yards ‘is not blighted,’ says Green, the legislator spoke forcefully:
“For the record, that neighborhood is not blighted, said Green. “I repeat, for the record, that neighborhood is not blighted.”
“Under the definition of blight, as related to poverty or environmental degradation, this definition is not related to Prospect Heights,” Green told The Brooklyn Papers afterwards.
The project would go forward because of a designation of blight:
“I think the state will make its decision, unlike ‘Kelo,’ based on whether or not they believe this is a blighted area,” Forest City Executive Director Jim Stuckey said in a Nov. 3 segment of “Newshour with Jim Lehrer,” echoing statements he made almost a year earlier at a public meeting at New York City College of Technology, Downtown.
Green added that he did consider part of the neighborhood blighted:
“One is the rail yards, which is blight, and then the other part, which is made up of residential and commercial properties. That other part is not blight.”
Well, blight generally implies neglect, and while the railyard has not been developed to support commercial or residential buildings, it has been operating. And it drew a $150 million bid from the Extell Development Corp., and a $100 million from Forest City Ratner to the Metropolitan Transporation Authority--and those bids (the MTA negotiated exclusively with Ratner) didn't require eminent domain to acquire the railyard.
While project opponents said that Green's statement hurt Forest City Ratner's case, it's probably more murky. First, a bill that clarifies eminent domain--such as requiring local government approval--would have to be passed by spring, before the state acted to acquire land in May or June.
And the state has had a lot of leeway, a law professor testified:
“Forest City Ratner argued that the property now being used for the New York Times building [near 42nd Street on Manhatan’s Westside] was blighted even though there were existing buildings and businesses there,” said David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor who writes about eminent domain. “The case for the Atlantic rail yards area appears even stronger because there is even less economic activity at that location.”
A Brooklyn Downtown Star article headlined Assembly Questions Eminent Domain Law pointed out that, after four hours of testimony from different perspectives, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, who chairs the Committee on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions, said he lacked a firm definition of what constitutes justification for exercise of the power. "I'm not any closer now that I was at the beginning of the day," Brodsky said.
There is clearly a divide:
Michael Cardoza, Corporation Counsel for the City Law Department, said use of eminent domain, as one of many tools for economic revitalization, is essential to the city's well being. He cited Times Square, Lincoln Center and MetroTech as evidence of the success of urban renewal in formerly blighted neighborhoods.
"Eminent domain is rarely the government's first choice. It can be costly and time consuming but it can be necessary," said Cardoza.
But [Scott] Bullock [of the Institute for Justice] said using the other tools should be sufficient in most cases. "Eminent domain for private economic development is simply not necessary," he said. "Economic development happens every single day in this country without eminent domain."
At a legislative hearing November 5, state Assemblyman Roger Green, a project supporter who represents the area, declared that it is not, in fact, blighted.
In a Brooklyn Papers article headlined Atlantic Yards ‘is not blighted,’ says Green, the legislator spoke forcefully:
“For the record, that neighborhood is not blighted, said Green. “I repeat, for the record, that neighborhood is not blighted.”
“Under the definition of blight, as related to poverty or environmental degradation, this definition is not related to Prospect Heights,” Green told The Brooklyn Papers afterwards.
The project would go forward because of a designation of blight:
“I think the state will make its decision, unlike ‘Kelo,’ based on whether or not they believe this is a blighted area,” Forest City Executive Director Jim Stuckey said in a Nov. 3 segment of “Newshour with Jim Lehrer,” echoing statements he made almost a year earlier at a public meeting at New York City College of Technology, Downtown.
Green added that he did consider part of the neighborhood blighted:
“One is the rail yards, which is blight, and then the other part, which is made up of residential and commercial properties. That other part is not blight.”
Well, blight generally implies neglect, and while the railyard has not been developed to support commercial or residential buildings, it has been operating. And it drew a $150 million bid from the Extell Development Corp., and a $100 million from Forest City Ratner to the Metropolitan Transporation Authority--and those bids (the MTA negotiated exclusively with Ratner) didn't require eminent domain to acquire the railyard.
While project opponents said that Green's statement hurt Forest City Ratner's case, it's probably more murky. First, a bill that clarifies eminent domain--such as requiring local government approval--would have to be passed by spring, before the state acted to acquire land in May or June.
And the state has had a lot of leeway, a law professor testified:
“Forest City Ratner argued that the property now being used for the New York Times building [near 42nd Street on Manhatan’s Westside] was blighted even though there were existing buildings and businesses there,” said David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor who writes about eminent domain. “The case for the Atlantic rail yards area appears even stronger because there is even less economic activity at that location.”
A Brooklyn Downtown Star article headlined Assembly Questions Eminent Domain Law pointed out that, after four hours of testimony from different perspectives, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, who chairs the Committee on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions, said he lacked a firm definition of what constitutes justification for exercise of the power. "I'm not any closer now that I was at the beginning of the day," Brodsky said.
There is clearly a divide:
Michael Cardoza, Corporation Counsel for the City Law Department, said use of eminent domain, as one of many tools for economic revitalization, is essential to the city's well being. He cited Times Square, Lincoln Center and MetroTech as evidence of the success of urban renewal in formerly blighted neighborhoods.
"Eminent domain is rarely the government's first choice. It can be costly and time consuming but it can be necessary," said Cardoza.
But [Scott] Bullock [of the Institute for Justice] said using the other tools should be sufficient in most cases. "Eminent domain for private economic development is simply not necessary," he said. "Economic development happens every single day in this country without eminent domain."
Forest City Ratner absent when it comes to ULURP discussion
Forest City Ratner representatives have regularly claimed that the company has been open about its plans and willing to meet with all interested parties. "Here we are opening ourselves up - tremendous transparency, for two years," VP Jim Stuckey told the New York Times last Sunday.
But FCR prefers public events where Atlantic Yards critics don't get equal time. Yes, company representatives have appeared at a few open meetings with mixed panels, but they've also avoided other meetings. Last February, the Fort Greene Association announced that that FCR pulled out of a meeting at which its presence had already been confirmed, and that representatives of BUILD and ACORN, two backers of the Atlantic Yards project, had not even replied to invitations. The FGA press release pointed out that FCR's Bruce Bender had told the New York Times:
"We've [FCRC has] gone above and beyond to meet with the community. We've met with all the community boards. We've never turned down anyone. We have been very open. To say we haven't is wrong, deceitful and outrageous.”
Yesterday, a Municipal Arts Society panel addressed the case of "Large-Scale Plans Removed from the Public Review Process: Focus on Atlantic Yards." Last week, the New York Observer's blog The Real Estate commented:
[N]one of the panelists, however, look ready to take Forest City’s side, or the Empire State Development Corporation’s, for that matter.
However, as moderator Tom Angotti announced at the session, Forest City Ratner "was invited several times to speak and declined the invitation." This was also noted by the New York Sun, in a 11/11/05 article headlined Critics of Ratner Plan Say Oversight of Project Too Lax. Spotted in the audience, however, was a Forest City Ratner public relations representative.
As the Sun article pointed out:
Because the state maintains oversight of the project, as stipulated in a memorandum of understanding signed in February, it is not subject to the city's Uniform Land Use Review Process. Under the more vigorous ULURP oversight procedure, community boards, the relevant borough president's office, the City Planning Commission, the City Council, and the mayor review proposals. Some of the panelists said they see a worrying trend of circumventing the city's land use procedures, which are designed to involve neighborhoods in development decisions.
"The evasion of ULURP looks like it's becoming a habit," the panel's moderator, Tom Angotti, a professor of urban planning at Hunter College, said. "Everything is backwards. Two years ago, a developer comes up with a proposal. It is essentially adopted and approved by the governor, mayor, and borough president. Two years later, the scoping process is mapped out. The planning process is after the fact."
Did it have to happen that way? After all, most of the land either belongs to the city or private parties, not the state:
Panelist Daniel Goldstein, who heads the most vocal opposition group to Atlantic Yards, Develop - Don't Destroy, said that while only about 30% of the development's footprint belongs to the state, the city is now locked out of the oversight process. Both the city and the state will contribute about $100 million to the Atlantic Yards development.
Mr. Goldstein faulted Mayor Bloomberg and the City Council speaker, Gifford Miller, for handing off the project to the state. "If the administration said to the state, 'We want to maintain some oversight on this,' they might have listened," he said.
By the way, a search of the New York Times archive on ULURP and "Atlantic Yards" comes up blank. As noted in Chapter 6 of my report, the only thing I could find was a glancing reference in a general article (What the Teams Want And What the City Gets, 1/16/05) about three sports teams and their demands:
All three projects would be built on public land and use tax-free bonds for financing. All three are also designed to bypass the city's land use review process and a vote by the City Council, thereby avoiding potentially troublesome public hearings.
More recently, the Times, in an 10/20/05 article that followed up on the ESDC season, did mention the land-use process without the acronym:
Because a state agency, the Empire State Development Corporation, is sponsoring the proposal, it will not have to wind through the city's labyrinthine land-use process, which requires input from the local community boards and a vote by the City Council.
But FCR prefers public events where Atlantic Yards critics don't get equal time. Yes, company representatives have appeared at a few open meetings with mixed panels, but they've also avoided other meetings. Last February, the Fort Greene Association announced that that FCR pulled out of a meeting at which its presence had already been confirmed, and that representatives of BUILD and ACORN, two backers of the Atlantic Yards project, had not even replied to invitations. The FGA press release pointed out that FCR's Bruce Bender had told the New York Times:
"We've [FCRC has] gone above and beyond to meet with the community. We've met with all the community boards. We've never turned down anyone. We have been very open. To say we haven't is wrong, deceitful and outrageous.”
Yesterday, a Municipal Arts Society panel addressed the case of "Large-Scale Plans Removed from the Public Review Process: Focus on Atlantic Yards." Last week, the New York Observer's blog The Real Estate commented:
[N]one of the panelists, however, look ready to take Forest City’s side, or the Empire State Development Corporation’s, for that matter.
However, as moderator Tom Angotti announced at the session, Forest City Ratner "was invited several times to speak and declined the invitation." This was also noted by the New York Sun, in a 11/11/05 article headlined Critics of Ratner Plan Say Oversight of Project Too Lax. Spotted in the audience, however, was a Forest City Ratner public relations representative.
As the Sun article pointed out:
Because the state maintains oversight of the project, as stipulated in a memorandum of understanding signed in February, it is not subject to the city's Uniform Land Use Review Process. Under the more vigorous ULURP oversight procedure, community boards, the relevant borough president's office, the City Planning Commission, the City Council, and the mayor review proposals. Some of the panelists said they see a worrying trend of circumventing the city's land use procedures, which are designed to involve neighborhoods in development decisions.
"The evasion of ULURP looks like it's becoming a habit," the panel's moderator, Tom Angotti, a professor of urban planning at Hunter College, said. "Everything is backwards. Two years ago, a developer comes up with a proposal. It is essentially adopted and approved by the governor, mayor, and borough president. Two years later, the scoping process is mapped out. The planning process is after the fact."
Did it have to happen that way? After all, most of the land either belongs to the city or private parties, not the state:
Panelist Daniel Goldstein, who heads the most vocal opposition group to Atlantic Yards, Develop - Don't Destroy, said that while only about 30% of the development's footprint belongs to the state, the city is now locked out of the oversight process. Both the city and the state will contribute about $100 million to the Atlantic Yards development.
Mr. Goldstein faulted Mayor Bloomberg and the City Council speaker, Gifford Miller, for handing off the project to the state. "If the administration said to the state, 'We want to maintain some oversight on this,' they might have listened," he said.
By the way, a search of the New York Times archive on ULURP and "Atlantic Yards" comes up blank. As noted in Chapter 6 of my report, the only thing I could find was a glancing reference in a general article (What the Teams Want And What the City Gets, 1/16/05) about three sports teams and their demands:
All three projects would be built on public land and use tax-free bonds for financing. All three are also designed to bypass the city's land use review process and a vote by the City Council, thereby avoiding potentially troublesome public hearings.
More recently, the Times, in an 10/20/05 article that followed up on the ESDC season, did mention the land-use process without the acronym:
Because a state agency, the Empire State Development Corporation, is sponsoring the proposal, it will not have to wind through the city's labyrinthine land-use process, which requires input from the local community boards and a vote by the City Council.
Thursday, November 10, 2005
Freddy’s Fumble: Ferrer mishandled Atlantic Yards, but the press made it worse
He coulda been a contender. Maybe Freddy Ferrer wouldn’t have won the election, but if he’d raised the Atlantic Yards issue early enough, and forcefully enough, he could’ve had Mayor Bloomberg on the defensive. At the least, he would’ve sparked some real debate about the mega-development in Brooklyn, a $3.5 billion project to build a Nets basketball arena and 16 high-rise buildings, nearly all of them housing--and mostly luxury housing at that.
Then again, maybe he never had a chance. Ferrer also faced a press corps that too often has failed to explain the controversy or to challenge project supporters like Bloomberg and the Rev. Al Sharpton.
Let’s recap. Atlantic Yards, the biggest project in Brooklyn’s history, was proposed in December 2003 by Forest City Ratner, the developer responsible for some much-criticized projects in the borough, such as the Atlantic Center mall and the office development at MetroTech. Company CEO Bruce Ratner, no sports fan, assembled an ownership group to buy the Nets at the urging of Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz, a nostalgist obsessed with making Brooklyn “major league” again. But the arena has distracted attention from the greased real estate deal (the Metropolitan Transportation Authority didn't put up the railyard at issue until the last minute, and then negotiated solely with low-bidder Ratner), and, as the project has gone forward, the drastic reductions in promised jobs and increases in market-rate housing.
Atlantic Yards was a significant part of Norman Siegel’s unsuccessful primary challenge to Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum and also allowed Gloria Mattera, the Green Party challenger to Markowitz, to score some significant points. But it didn’t become an issue in the mayoral race until October 28, less than two weeks before Election Day.
Ferrer had flirted with the topic. In early May, he said at a press conference, “To call that process not transparent is probably the understatement of the year.” On July 4, when I encountered him campaigning and asked him his position, his answer was indelible: “Not a dime of public money.” (The city had already pledged $100 million in direct subsidies, with hundreds of millions more in public costs to be absorbed.) But Ferrer refused to challenge his Democratic rivals on the issue during the primary debates.
Because Ferrer was silent for so long during the mayoral election, even the wonky web site Gotham Gazette neglected to mention Atlantic Yards in an Oct. 17 piece headlined “The Real Issues in the 2005 Mayoral Race.” A 3852-word Times profile of Bloomberg-as-manager the next day also neglected the Brooklyn development. But a contentious public hearing on Atlantic Yards that evening (Oct. 18) put the project back in the news, as did a follow-up New York Times headline, “From Huge Project, A Mighty Anger Grows.”
Maybe Ferrer belatedly remembered to do the right thing, or maybe it was his falling numbers in the polls, but he finally scheduled an Oct. 28 press conference to announce opposition to the project. It was a debacle. First, project backers rounded up union members to bring two giant rats, assailing Ferrer for fighting a project that would bring union jobs. Worse, Ferrer read his press statement with little enthusiasm. He failed to bring local City Council Member Letitia James, a forceful critic of the project, who could have served as a counterweight to the numerous black protestors. Afterward, the Rev. Al Sharpton, a supporter of both Ferrer but also of Atlantic Yards, issued a statement criticizing Ferrer for opposing a project that could, in the Times’s phrasing, “mean thousands of minority jobs.”
Sharpton’s criticism, not Ferrer’s opposition, became the storyline; the Times’s headline was “Ferrer Is Chided Over Atlantic Yards.” But Ferrer made some important points. He said that he had found the 50% affordable housing agreement announced in May “powerful,” but that it had recently—actually, it had been more than a month—emerged that Forest City Ratner had added 2,800 market-rate condos, making only 31% of the housing affordable, with less than half of that total accessible to the average Brooklynite.
But that was obscured by Sharpton’s shiv. The Times’s coverage was especially egregious—the reporter quoted project supporter Tony Herbert, a Republican candidate for City Council, without pointing out that Herbert was likely to be crushed by the incumbent James, who had already vanquished a pro-Atlantic Yards candidate in the Democratic primary. (He was, by a 13-1 ratio.) And the Times ended the story by quoting Forest City Ratner officials as saying that Ferrer misrepresented facts, but without any examples nor an effort to check the allegation. (Perhaps here I should point out that the New York Times Company and Ratner are partners in the new Times Tower—no proof of bias, but certainly an argument for exacting coverage to preclude claims of bias.)
Still, Ferrer missed his biggest chance, to challenge Sharpton and other project supporters on the issue of “jobs.” The developer’s slogan is “Jobs, Housing, and Hoops”—a mantra shouted by heckler at the press conference--but the term “jobs” subsumes both temporary construction jobs and permanent office jobs. In both cases, Ratner and project supporters have fudged the numbers. The promised “15,000 construction jobs” would actually mean 1,500 jobs a year for ten years—a huge difference if 35% are designated for minorities. As for the office jobs, Ratner originally announced 10,000 jobs; now there would be space for maybe 2,500 jobs, with less than one-third of them actually new jobs rather than moved from Manhattan.
But you can’t blame Ferrer too much, because the press in New York hadn’t analyzed the job numbers. So, when it came to the first debate two days later, the press let Bloomberg take cover by quoting Sharpton, with no attempt to factcheck Sharpton. Nor did the press counter Bloomberg’s outlandish claims that the project had been scrutinized by community boards and the press.
And Ferrer got one issue backwards. He called the Community Benefits Agreement, an effort to designate some jobs, community facilities, and community services for local residents, “powerful.” However, experts say this CBA isn’t legitimate because it involves only preselected groups. Ferrer should’ve said he supported the concept of a CBA, but not its execution, especially since one group, Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), had already been unmasked as receiving money from Ratner while denying it.
It got worse in the second debate on Nov. 1, when questioner Jorge Ramos of Telemundo said, in prefacing his question, that “45% of the jobs” would go to minorities, while misstating the percentage (35%) and the important distinction between construction jobs and office jobs. That left Ferrer on the defensive, saying that it was “amazing that we need boondoggle projects to do the right thing.” He couldn’t make the distinction between construction jobs and total jobs, nor mention how the number of office jobs, once a selling point for the project, had plummeted.
For the third time, Ferrer cited a “secret memo” regarding the project, without explaining it well. Bloomberg was able to defuse the discussion with a quip–“if the memo’s out, it’s certainly not a secret.” No press outlet explained that the memo, which would allow the developer to control more land and build higher, had to be obtained by the anti-Atlantic Yards group Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn.
Could Ferrer have shifted the tone of the discussion? Perhaps. Then again, even his criticism of the affordable housing agreement didn’t gain the attention it deserved. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn’s Oct. 31 press release criticizing Bloomberg, issued after the first debate, had little effect.
On Nov. 6, two days before the election, two Daily News sports reporters--from a paper that had issued an error-filled endorsement of Atlantic Yards--told us that Sharpton’s National Action Network had received thousands of dollars from Forest City Ratner. Daily News sports columnist Mike Lupica, who had taken on Ratner in an earlier column, denounced multiple examples of the developer’s dubious math. And the Times, in an article that gave project supporters far more space than critics, finally reported the cuts in promised office jobs, as well as “bait and switch” charges about the housing plan.
But the debates were over and, in the Times's story on Election Day, Atlantic Yards had emerged as part of Bloomberg's second term agenda.
Then again, maybe he never had a chance. Ferrer also faced a press corps that too often has failed to explain the controversy or to challenge project supporters like Bloomberg and the Rev. Al Sharpton.
Let’s recap. Atlantic Yards, the biggest project in Brooklyn’s history, was proposed in December 2003 by Forest City Ratner, the developer responsible for some much-criticized projects in the borough, such as the Atlantic Center mall and the office development at MetroTech. Company CEO Bruce Ratner, no sports fan, assembled an ownership group to buy the Nets at the urging of Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz, a nostalgist obsessed with making Brooklyn “major league” again. But the arena has distracted attention from the greased real estate deal (the Metropolitan Transportation Authority didn't put up the railyard at issue until the last minute, and then negotiated solely with low-bidder Ratner), and, as the project has gone forward, the drastic reductions in promised jobs and increases in market-rate housing.
Atlantic Yards was a significant part of Norman Siegel’s unsuccessful primary challenge to Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum and also allowed Gloria Mattera, the Green Party challenger to Markowitz, to score some significant points. But it didn’t become an issue in the mayoral race until October 28, less than two weeks before Election Day.
Ferrer had flirted with the topic. In early May, he said at a press conference, “To call that process not transparent is probably the understatement of the year.” On July 4, when I encountered him campaigning and asked him his position, his answer was indelible: “Not a dime of public money.” (The city had already pledged $100 million in direct subsidies, with hundreds of millions more in public costs to be absorbed.) But Ferrer refused to challenge his Democratic rivals on the issue during the primary debates.
Because Ferrer was silent for so long during the mayoral election, even the wonky web site Gotham Gazette neglected to mention Atlantic Yards in an Oct. 17 piece headlined “The Real Issues in the 2005 Mayoral Race.” A 3852-word Times profile of Bloomberg-as-manager the next day also neglected the Brooklyn development. But a contentious public hearing on Atlantic Yards that evening (Oct. 18) put the project back in the news, as did a follow-up New York Times headline, “From Huge Project, A Mighty Anger Grows.”
Maybe Ferrer belatedly remembered to do the right thing, or maybe it was his falling numbers in the polls, but he finally scheduled an Oct. 28 press conference to announce opposition to the project. It was a debacle. First, project backers rounded up union members to bring two giant rats, assailing Ferrer for fighting a project that would bring union jobs. Worse, Ferrer read his press statement with little enthusiasm. He failed to bring local City Council Member Letitia James, a forceful critic of the project, who could have served as a counterweight to the numerous black protestors. Afterward, the Rev. Al Sharpton, a supporter of both Ferrer but also of Atlantic Yards, issued a statement criticizing Ferrer for opposing a project that could, in the Times’s phrasing, “mean thousands of minority jobs.”
Sharpton’s criticism, not Ferrer’s opposition, became the storyline; the Times’s headline was “Ferrer Is Chided Over Atlantic Yards.” But Ferrer made some important points. He said that he had found the 50% affordable housing agreement announced in May “powerful,” but that it had recently—actually, it had been more than a month—emerged that Forest City Ratner had added 2,800 market-rate condos, making only 31% of the housing affordable, with less than half of that total accessible to the average Brooklynite.
But that was obscured by Sharpton’s shiv. The Times’s coverage was especially egregious—the reporter quoted project supporter Tony Herbert, a Republican candidate for City Council, without pointing out that Herbert was likely to be crushed by the incumbent James, who had already vanquished a pro-Atlantic Yards candidate in the Democratic primary. (He was, by a 13-1 ratio.) And the Times ended the story by quoting Forest City Ratner officials as saying that Ferrer misrepresented facts, but without any examples nor an effort to check the allegation. (Perhaps here I should point out that the New York Times Company and Ratner are partners in the new Times Tower—no proof of bias, but certainly an argument for exacting coverage to preclude claims of bias.)
Still, Ferrer missed his biggest chance, to challenge Sharpton and other project supporters on the issue of “jobs.” The developer’s slogan is “Jobs, Housing, and Hoops”—a mantra shouted by heckler at the press conference--but the term “jobs” subsumes both temporary construction jobs and permanent office jobs. In both cases, Ratner and project supporters have fudged the numbers. The promised “15,000 construction jobs” would actually mean 1,500 jobs a year for ten years—a huge difference if 35% are designated for minorities. As for the office jobs, Ratner originally announced 10,000 jobs; now there would be space for maybe 2,500 jobs, with less than one-third of them actually new jobs rather than moved from Manhattan.
But you can’t blame Ferrer too much, because the press in New York hadn’t analyzed the job numbers. So, when it came to the first debate two days later, the press let Bloomberg take cover by quoting Sharpton, with no attempt to factcheck Sharpton. Nor did the press counter Bloomberg’s outlandish claims that the project had been scrutinized by community boards and the press.
And Ferrer got one issue backwards. He called the Community Benefits Agreement, an effort to designate some jobs, community facilities, and community services for local residents, “powerful.” However, experts say this CBA isn’t legitimate because it involves only preselected groups. Ferrer should’ve said he supported the concept of a CBA, but not its execution, especially since one group, Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), had already been unmasked as receiving money from Ratner while denying it.
It got worse in the second debate on Nov. 1, when questioner Jorge Ramos of Telemundo said, in prefacing his question, that “45% of the jobs” would go to minorities, while misstating the percentage (35%) and the important distinction between construction jobs and office jobs. That left Ferrer on the defensive, saying that it was “amazing that we need boondoggle projects to do the right thing.” He couldn’t make the distinction between construction jobs and total jobs, nor mention how the number of office jobs, once a selling point for the project, had plummeted.
For the third time, Ferrer cited a “secret memo” regarding the project, without explaining it well. Bloomberg was able to defuse the discussion with a quip–“if the memo’s out, it’s certainly not a secret.” No press outlet explained that the memo, which would allow the developer to control more land and build higher, had to be obtained by the anti-Atlantic Yards group Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn.
Could Ferrer have shifted the tone of the discussion? Perhaps. Then again, even his criticism of the affordable housing agreement didn’t gain the attention it deserved. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn’s Oct. 31 press release criticizing Bloomberg, issued after the first debate, had little effect.
On Nov. 6, two days before the election, two Daily News sports reporters--from a paper that had issued an error-filled endorsement of Atlantic Yards--told us that Sharpton’s National Action Network had received thousands of dollars from Forest City Ratner. Daily News sports columnist Mike Lupica, who had taken on Ratner in an earlier column, denounced multiple examples of the developer’s dubious math. And the Times, in an article that gave project supporters far more space than critics, finally reported the cuts in promised office jobs, as well as “bait and switch” charges about the housing plan.
But the debates were over and, in the Times's story on Election Day, Atlantic Yards had emerged as part of Bloomberg's second term agenda.
Sunday, November 06, 2005
The Times (and Lupica) address jobs and housing at Atlantic Yards: who's Orwellian?
[Updated with subheadings 6/6/09]
Look at Forest City Ratner's manipulation of numbers--office jobs, construction jobs, basketball attendance, and more--and there's ample reason for skepticism, as noted by Daily News sports columnist Mike Lupica in his 11/6/05 column headlined Math doesn't add up in Ratner world. (Yes, Lupica relies partly on this blog.)
Also the new article didn't point out that Ratner added a building on Site 5, now home to the low-rise Modells and P.C. Richard stores across Flatbush Avenue in Park Slope.
So how many jobs will there be after all? The Times cited unnamed "critics":
Critics said, though, that even the reduced job estimates were overstated, because they do not account for likely vacancy rates or for jobs lost when businesses currently occupying the site are forced out. Based on those factors, they said, the net gain from the project would be fewer than 1,000 new office jobs.
Unmentioned is perhaps the most important factor: many office jobs would likely not be new, just moved from Manhattan. After all, working from the original plans, the New York City Economic Development Corporation stated:
The fiscal impact analysis, however, assumes that only 30% of these jobs...are new to the New York economy.
In letters dated last June and July - weeks after Mr. Stuckey outlined the potential conversion to more residential units at a May hearing - more than two dozen union leaders and elected officials expressed their support for Mr. Ratner's bid. Many of them cited the developer's earlier promise of 10,000 permanent jobs in the project's commercial portion and the so-called 50-50 housing deal with Acorn.
So why were the officials misinformed? The Times article doesn't say, but the press--and the Times itself--could be blamed. It neglected to cover the 5/26/05 City Council hearing and, on 6/28/05 printed a brief article based on a mayoral press release, claiming there would be 8,500 office jobs. A front-page 7/5/05 article about the project, headlined "Instant Skyline Added to Arena Plan," did not mention the decrease in office jobs. Meanwhile, Stuckey had announced the changes at the hearing, and Forest City Ratner's own Brooklyn Standard publication, released 6/17/05, promised only 6,000 jobs. Mayor Bloomberg issued an incorrect 9/14/05 press release claiming there would be 8,500 permanent jobs and only 4,500 residential units.
So why didn't the Times ask some of these officials if they feel they were misled, or of if they have reevaluated their support?
But are critics Orwellian? Wouldn't the developer's deceptive fliers--like this and this--qualify? Or the Brooklyn Standard, which the Times itself dismissed as "basically an ad." Or the latest Brooklyn Standard, with its deceptive and possibly fake bylines?
And the original fact sheet gushed:
The roof of the Arena offers an exciting opportunity to create new public space, with 52,000 square feet in four lushly landscaped areas for passive recreation and a promenade along the outside edge of the roof with outstanding panoramic vistas facing Manhattan. For active recreation, an outdoor ice-skating ink connects the four gardens; in warmer months the rink will become a running track. This open space not only provides a destination for community residents as well as for the workers in the office buildings-–it also allows the commercial buildings surrounding the arena to be connected at the sky-lobby level.
Looking at the housing
The Times noted:
The agreement signed last May between Mr. Ratner and Ms. Lewis applied only to the 4,500 rental units envisioned in the original plan. But it included a provision that if the developer added more residential units, the firm would develop 600 to 1,000 moderately priced for-sale units on or near the project site, in effect offering something close to a 50-50 ratio for all the housing associated with the project.
Not quite. There's no assurance that the new units would be near the project, and it's important to tease out the definition of "affordable." The MOU states:
Developer and ACORN will work on a program to develop affordable for-sale units,which are intended to be in the range of 600 to 1000 units,over the course of ten (10) years and can be on or off site.It is currently contemplated that a majority of the affordable for-sale units will be sold to families in the upper affordable income tiers.
The upper-affordable income tiers include families earning more than $100,000 a year —surely not ACORN’s constituency. Of the Atlantic Yards rentals, 30% would go to middle-income families, 20% to lower-income ones.
Letting Ratner off the hook
They added more market-rate housing to help out ACORN? That doesn't make sense. Also, while the developer has indeed been technically faithful to the ACORN agreement, none of the press coverage of the initial announcement raised the possibility that there would be additional units.
Why not ask ACORN why its efforts mostly help people outside its constituency?
One more thing. The Times article offered an unsubstantiated assessment of the project design:
The other towers - some smaller than before, some larger - still stand amid acres of green space carefully sculptured to welcome residents of the adjoining streets.
That may well be what's intended, but it certainly deserves comment from an authority.
So the New York Times finally addressed the drastic reduction in office jobs and increase in luxury housing at Atlantic Yards, in an 11/6/05 article headlined Routine Changes, or 'Bait and Switch'?. While the article did go well beyond previous coverage in the Times and other dailies, it notably gave developer Forest City Ratner the benefit of the doubt in several places.
And, while welcome, the article failed to appear before the mayoral debates, when it might have had some impact (and better informed Atlantic Yards critic Freddy Ferrer). Also unmentioned is the failure of the Times itself to earlier inform readers of the changes in the project.
And, while welcome, the article failed to appear before the mayoral debates, when it might have had some impact (and better informed Atlantic Yards critic Freddy Ferrer). Also unmentioned is the failure of the Times itself to earlier inform readers of the changes in the project.
Reasons for skepticism
Look at Forest City Ratner's manipulation of numbers--office jobs, construction jobs, basketball attendance, and more--and there's ample reason for skepticism, as noted by Daily News sports columnist Mike Lupica in his 11/6/05 column headlined Math doesn't add up in Ratner world. (Yes, Lupica relies partly on this blog.)
Unlike the Times, Lupica sees fit to mention the "15,000 construction jobs" long touted by Ratner; the claim actually means 1,500 jobs a year for ten years. The Times in other contexts has reported that construction jobs are calculated in job-years.
Blaming "opponents"
Blaming "opponents"
The deck below the Times headline stated "Fewer Jobs and More Condos, Ratner's Opponents Complain" and the headline on the jump page was "Ratner Project's Opponents Complain That It Has Changed."
First, in an article of 37 paragraphs, only five were devoted to the views of critics. The deck might better have stated "Ratner Officials Defend Project Changes." The article made no attempt to query project supporters who had enthused about the once-promised 10,000 office jobs. It's quite possible that not only opponents but supporters would complain about the drastic cut in office jobs.
The article neglected to point out that the developer maintains the slogan, "Jobs, Housing, and Hoops," and its supporters still tout job creation, even as the number of possible jobs has declined drastically.
Misreading "Atlantic Yards"
Misreading "Atlantic Yards"
Take the caption on the front of the Metro section, which stated, "A development executive of Forest City Ratner Companies, James P. Stuckey, looking out over the Atlantic Yards last month."
Actually, "Atlantic Yards" is the name of a development yet unbuilt. The railyard behind Stuckey is more precisely called "Vanderbilt Yard." And the caption could give the misimpression that the block of buildings behind the railyard would not be part of the project footprint.
Correction confirmed
Correction confirmed
One paragraph in the story confirmed a correction I requested on Nov. 3. I pointed out that a Times correction that stated that Atlantic Yards "calls for an arena for the Nets basketball team and office, residential and commercial building--not just residential" itself deserved a correction, because the project is predominantly residential.
Indeed, the new article cited the transformation of Atlantic Yards into essentially a large residential development with an arena and a relatively small amount of office and retail space attached to it.
Fewer jobs, more condos
The lead of the new article set the stage at the December 2003 news conference announcing the project:
It would provide 10,000 office jobs and more than 4,000 units of rental housing, half of it set aside for low- and middle-income families. Its centerpiece would be a Frank Gehry-designed arena for the Nets basketball team, topped by a "lushly landscaped" public park with "outstanding panoramic vistas facing Manhattan."
...In other respects, however, the Atlantic Yards envisioned today looks very different from the one unveiled nearly two years ago. The project's size has jumped by a million square feet, and its dollar cost by 40 percent, to $3.5 billion. Commercial space, once a substantial portion of the overall square footage, has dropped dramatically, replaced by thousands of for-sale apartments and a hotel.
Nearly three-quarters of the office jobs originally projected are gone; the new apartments do not count as part of the so-called 50-50 agreement under which 2,250 apartments are to be rented below market rates, and the park on the arena's roof is to be accessible only to residents.
To be specific: there would only be space for 2,500 office jobs, not 10,000, and 2,800 market-rate condos have been added to 4,500 rentals.
"Projects change, markets change"
Fewer jobs, more condos
The lead of the new article set the stage at the December 2003 news conference announcing the project:
It would provide 10,000 office jobs and more than 4,000 units of rental housing, half of it set aside for low- and middle-income families. Its centerpiece would be a Frank Gehry-designed arena for the Nets basketball team, topped by a "lushly landscaped" public park with "outstanding panoramic vistas facing Manhattan."
...In other respects, however, the Atlantic Yards envisioned today looks very different from the one unveiled nearly two years ago. The project's size has jumped by a million square feet, and its dollar cost by 40 percent, to $3.5 billion. Commercial space, once a substantial portion of the overall square footage, has dropped dramatically, replaced by thousands of for-sale apartments and a hotel.
Nearly three-quarters of the office jobs originally projected are gone; the new apartments do not count as part of the so-called 50-50 agreement under which 2,250 apartments are to be rented below market rates, and the park on the arena's roof is to be accessible only to residents.
To be specific: there would only be space for 2,500 office jobs, not 10,000, and 2,800 market-rate condos have been added to 4,500 rentals.
"Projects change, markets change"
The explanation from Stuckey is that "Projects change, markets change." The Rev. Clinton M. Miller, of the Downtown Brooklyn Leadership Coalition, counters, "They were willing to say anything to get community support, and that is why it is dangerous for the community to accept promises from the outset."
Unmentioned in the article is Forest City Ratner's aggressive attempt to sell the project--with 10,000 new jobs and the 50-50 housing agreement--to the public in fliers like this and this.
Cost increase
Cost increase
So why did the project cost grow from $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion? The Times's answer:
Several factors have converged to raise the project's price tag, including increasing construction costs, the above-market prices the developer has paid to buy out residents who live on the project's footprint, the extra $50 million the developer offered for rights to build over the Metropolitan Transportation Authority rail yard, and the cost of renovating the yard itself.
The extra $50 million the developer offered? Forest City Ratner's initial $50 million bid for the MTA's Vanderbilt Yard was made in mid-2005, and the additional $50 million was announced in September. The Times's formulation suggests that the developer was only planning to offer a lowball $50 million all along.
Several factors have converged to raise the project's price tag, including increasing construction costs, the above-market prices the developer has paid to buy out residents who live on the project's footprint, the extra $50 million the developer offered for rights to build over the Metropolitan Transportation Authority rail yard, and the cost of renovating the yard itself.
The extra $50 million the developer offered? Forest City Ratner's initial $50 million bid for the MTA's Vanderbilt Yard was made in mid-2005, and the additional $50 million was announced in September. The Times's formulation suggests that the developer was only planning to offer a lowball $50 million all along.
However, at the 5/4/04 City Council hearing on Atlantic Yards, Stuckey pledged a fair payment: [F]or the land, the public land, the MTA land, is that, what we have agreed to is that we will lease or buy that land at the fair market value... by whatever independent process that they normally use.
Remember, the railyard was appraised at $214.5 million, and sold to the developer for only $100 million.
From offices to housing
So why was office space traded for luxury housing?
Officials of Forest City Ratner said they eventually realized that they would have to reduce the amount of commercial space, to accommodate condominium units that would help pay for the project, including the below-market rental housing.
Eventually realized? That's disingenuous. The developer and the community group ACORN signed the Housing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 5/17/05 to great fanfare at a press conference 5/19/05. A week later, at a 5/26/05 City Council hearing , Forest City Ratner announced plans to increase the amount of housing by 1,500 or perhaps 2,800 units. (Ultimately, they chose 2,800 units.)
So why was office space traded for luxury housing?
Officials of Forest City Ratner said they eventually realized that they would have to reduce the amount of commercial space, to accommodate condominium units that would help pay for the project, including the below-market rental housing.
Eventually realized? That's disingenuous. The developer and the community group ACORN signed the Housing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 5/17/05 to great fanfare at a press conference 5/19/05. A week later, at a 5/26/05 City Council hearing , Forest City Ratner announced plans to increase the amount of housing by 1,500 or perhaps 2,800 units. (Ultimately, they chose 2,800 units.)
The evidence suggests that Forest City Ratner had the condo plan in the cards for a while, but wanted ACORN on board first. After all, the MOU acknowledges that Forest City Ratner could change the size of the project if the developer deemed it "economically necessary."
How big are offices?
How big are offices?
The Times pointed out that there's another reason for fewer office jobs:
The earlier estimates were also based on a ratio of one job per 200 square feet of space, but the Empire State Development Corporation, which released the September planning documents, uses a less generous ratio of one job per 250 square feet of space, amplifying the reduction.
Actually, the ESDC doesn't mention the square footage issue at all; that was the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC).
The earlier estimates were also based on a ratio of one job per 200 square feet of space, but the Empire State Development Corporation, which released the September planning documents, uses a less generous ratio of one job per 250 square feet of space, amplifying the reduction.
Actually, the ESDC doesn't mention the square footage issue at all; that was the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC).
And there's another way to frame this change: Forest City Ratner was overoptimistic from the start. It's not untrue that the 250 square-feet-per-job is a "less generous ratio," but that's not the full story. It's the industry standard, as noted not only by the NYCEDC but also in documents from Ratner's own consultant, economist Andrew Zimbalist.
Residential vs. commercial
Residential vs. commercial
The Times article added some useful clarity about size and density:
The move to include more housing also increased the total square footage of the project. Because the ceilings of residential units are several feet lower than those of commercial units, however, it did not require more floors in each building. Indeed, the project will have one building less than originally planned, lowering its overall density somewhat.
Interesting, but it seems to contradict the Times's 7/5/05 article headlined "Instant Skyline Added to Brooklyn Arena Plan," which stated:
But the real impact would be in the size and density of the buildings, which are taller and bulkier than once envisioned.
With 17 buildings, many of them soaring 40 to 50 stories, the project would forever transform the borough and its often-intimate landscape, creating a dense urban skyline reminiscent of Houston or Dallas.
The move to include more housing also increased the total square footage of the project. Because the ceilings of residential units are several feet lower than those of commercial units, however, it did not require more floors in each building. Indeed, the project will have one building less than originally planned, lowering its overall density somewhat.
Interesting, but it seems to contradict the Times's 7/5/05 article headlined "Instant Skyline Added to Brooklyn Arena Plan," which stated:
But the real impact would be in the size and density of the buildings, which are taller and bulkier than once envisioned.
With 17 buildings, many of them soaring 40 to 50 stories, the project would forever transform the borough and its often-intimate landscape, creating a dense urban skyline reminiscent of Houston or Dallas.
Adding Site 5
Also the new article didn't point out that Ratner added a building on Site 5, now home to the low-rise Modells and P.C. Richard stores across Flatbush Avenue in Park Slope.
Toting up the jobs
So how many jobs will there be after all? The Times cited unnamed "critics":
Critics said, though, that even the reduced job estimates were overstated, because they do not account for likely vacancy rates or for jobs lost when businesses currently occupying the site are forced out. Based on those factors, they said, the net gain from the project would be fewer than 1,000 new office jobs.
Unmentioned is perhaps the most important factor: many office jobs would likely not be new, just moved from Manhattan. After all, working from the original plans, the New York City Economic Development Corporation stated:
The fiscal impact analysis, however, assumes that only 30% of these jobs...are new to the New York economy.
The Times unfairly implies that only critics offer further caveats on job claims; so does the NYCEDC, a booster of the development.
Housing bait-and-switch?
Housing bait-and-switch?
The Times quoted a critic on the housing promises:
"The problem is, Bertha Lewis and Mayor Bloomberg and Ratner are out there calling it a 50-50 plan, not a 50-50 plan just for rentals," said Daniel Goldstein, the spokesman for Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn. "It's a bait and switch. What they announced as a revolutionary housing deal is not."
And the Times pointed out that the numbers were important:
The 50-50 deal and the more generous job numbers were frequently cited by politicians and others supporting the project, and favoring Mr. Ratner's bid to buy air rights over the rail yards for tens of millions of dollars less than their appraised worth.
"The problem is, Bertha Lewis and Mayor Bloomberg and Ratner are out there calling it a 50-50 plan, not a 50-50 plan just for rentals," said Daniel Goldstein, the spokesman for Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn. "It's a bait and switch. What they announced as a revolutionary housing deal is not."
And the Times pointed out that the numbers were important:
The 50-50 deal and the more generous job numbers were frequently cited by politicians and others supporting the project, and favoring Mr. Ratner's bid to buy air rights over the rail yards for tens of millions of dollars less than their appraised worth.
In letters dated last June and July - weeks after Mr. Stuckey outlined the potential conversion to more residential units at a May hearing - more than two dozen union leaders and elected officials expressed their support for Mr. Ratner's bid. Many of them cited the developer's earlier promise of 10,000 permanent jobs in the project's commercial portion and the so-called 50-50 housing deal with Acorn.
Blame the press
So why were the officials misinformed? The Times article doesn't say, but the press--and the Times itself--could be blamed. It neglected to cover the 5/26/05 City Council hearing and, on 6/28/05 printed a brief article based on a mayoral press release, claiming there would be 8,500 office jobs. A front-page 7/5/05 article about the project, headlined "Instant Skyline Added to Arena Plan," did not mention the decrease in office jobs. Meanwhile, Stuckey had announced the changes at the hearing, and Forest City Ratner's own Brooklyn Standard publication, released 6/17/05, promised only 6,000 jobs. Mayor Bloomberg issued an incorrect 9/14/05 press release claiming there would be 8,500 permanent jobs and only 4,500 residential units.
So why didn't the Times ask some of these officials if they feel they were misled, or of if they have reevaluated their support?
Stuckey's explanation
Here's the juiciest part of the article:
In an interview, Mr. Stuckey, the executive of Forest City Ratner, suggested that Forest City Ratner was paying a price for being forthcoming about its plans....
"What's interesting is that we've been out talking to people for two years. And this week, the approval process began," he said in an interview in October. "Here we are opening ourselves up - tremendous transparency, for two years. Yet the criticism is, 'Wait a second, they didn't tell us something about the evolution of their planning process before the public process began'? Just think about what that means."
"It's Orwellian, almost," Mr. Stuckey added.
In Stuckey's defense, the company has published some information about its project in the Brooklyn Standard (the first issue mentioned 6,000 office jobs and the latest issue merely "thousands"), and information has been available from the Empire State Development Corporation since mid-September--though most of the press was too lazy to analyze it.
Here's the juiciest part of the article:
In an interview, Mr. Stuckey, the executive of Forest City Ratner, suggested that Forest City Ratner was paying a price for being forthcoming about its plans....
"What's interesting is that we've been out talking to people for two years. And this week, the approval process began," he said in an interview in October. "Here we are opening ourselves up - tremendous transparency, for two years. Yet the criticism is, 'Wait a second, they didn't tell us something about the evolution of their planning process before the public process began'? Just think about what that means."
"It's Orwellian, almost," Mr. Stuckey added.
In Stuckey's defense, the company has published some information about its project in the Brooklyn Standard (the first issue mentioned 6,000 office jobs and the latest issue merely "thousands"), and information has been available from the Empire State Development Corporation since mid-September--though most of the press was too lazy to analyze it.
Who's Orwellian?
But are critics Orwellian? Wouldn't the developer's deceptive fliers--like this and this--qualify? Or the Brooklyn Standard, which the Times itself dismissed as "basically an ad." Or the latest Brooklyn Standard, with its deceptive and possibly fake bylines?
Or the Community Benefits Agreement, decried by experts as not legitimate because it involved only selected groups?
And what about the company's web site, which until early November continued to maintain the December 2003 press releases that promised 10,000 jobs and 4,500 housing units? (For the original web site, go to the Wayback Machine. Start with the Dec. 17, 2003 iteration--the updates in 2004 merely change the names of the spokespeople.)
About that park on the arena roof
The Times reported:
Officials of Forest City Ratner - the development partner in building a new Midtown headquarters for The New York Times Company - gave several reasons for the switch to a private park. One was that as the buildings rimming the arena were re-mapped to house more residential units, there were fewer public access points for the roof of the arena. Another was that the city building code would have treated the park as a public assembly area, requiring cumbersome safety features. Finally, Mr. Stuckey said, discussions with planning experts revealed that "generally, open space up in the air doesn't work - people don't use it."
While the new plan closes the park to the public, he said, it adds more park acreage to the overall project.
"We took what was on the roof and put it on the ground where people can use it," he said.
Then again, Ratner spokesman Joe DePlasco had said that it was also to help the residential tenants.
About that park on the arena roof
The Times reported:
Officials of Forest City Ratner - the development partner in building a new Midtown headquarters for The New York Times Company - gave several reasons for the switch to a private park. One was that as the buildings rimming the arena were re-mapped to house more residential units, there were fewer public access points for the roof of the arena. Another was that the city building code would have treated the park as a public assembly area, requiring cumbersome safety features. Finally, Mr. Stuckey said, discussions with planning experts revealed that "generally, open space up in the air doesn't work - people don't use it."
While the new plan closes the park to the public, he said, it adds more park acreage to the overall project.
"We took what was on the roof and put it on the ground where people can use it," he said.
Then again, Ratner spokesman Joe DePlasco had said that it was also to help the residential tenants.
Original promise
And the original fact sheet gushed:
The roof of the Arena offers an exciting opportunity to create new public space, with 52,000 square feet in four lushly landscaped areas for passive recreation and a promenade along the outside edge of the roof with outstanding panoramic vistas facing Manhattan. For active recreation, an outdoor ice-skating ink connects the four gardens; in warmer months the rink will become a running track. This open space not only provides a destination for community residents as well as for the workers in the office buildings-–it also allows the commercial buildings surrounding the arena to be connected at the sky-lobby level.
Looking at the housing
The Times noted:
The agreement signed last May between Mr. Ratner and Ms. Lewis applied only to the 4,500 rental units envisioned in the original plan. But it included a provision that if the developer added more residential units, the firm would develop 600 to 1,000 moderately priced for-sale units on or near the project site, in effect offering something close to a 50-50 ratio for all the housing associated with the project.
Not quite. There's no assurance that the new units would be near the project, and it's important to tease out the definition of "affordable." The MOU states:
Developer and ACORN will work on a program to develop affordable for-sale units,which are intended to be in the range of 600 to 1000 units,over the course of ten (10) years and can be on or off site.It is currently contemplated that a majority of the affordable for-sale units will be sold to families in the upper affordable income tiers.
The upper-affordable income tiers include families earning more than $100,000 a year —surely not ACORN’s constituency. Of the Atlantic Yards rentals, 30% would go to middle-income families, 20% to lower-income ones.
Letting Ratner off the hook
Here's where the Times let Ratner get away with being disingenuous:
At the time, officials of Forest City Ratner said they were already contemplating adding 1,500 condominium units, in part because community leaders had pushed Mr. Ratner to include more housing in the project... Forest City Ratner officials said that they had remained faithful to the Acorn agreement, which did not require that half of the new for-sale units be priced affordably.
At the time, officials of Forest City Ratner said they were already contemplating adding 1,500 condominium units, in part because community leaders had pushed Mr. Ratner to include more housing in the project... Forest City Ratner officials said that they had remained faithful to the Acorn agreement, which did not require that half of the new for-sale units be priced affordably.
They added more market-rate housing to help out ACORN? That doesn't make sense. Also, while the developer has indeed been technically faithful to the ACORN agreement, none of the press coverage of the initial announcement raised the possibility that there would be additional units.
New math
The Times suggested that the project might indeed provide 40 percent affordable housing:
But if the developer chooses to build the maximum of 1,000 moderately priced for-sale units described in the Acorn agreement and builds them off-site, then the total number of for-sale and rental units associated with the project would reach 8,300, of which 3,250 would be priced below market rates - about 40 percent.
Much of the city's moderately priced housing is built through an arrangement called the 80-20 Program, under which city and state agencies subsidize construction projects by providing developers with tax-exempt bonds. In exchange, the developers set aside 20 percent of the apartment units for tenants who earn 50 percent or less of the area's median income.
But what percentage would be truly affordable, to people earning under Brooklyn's median income? Despite the mention of the 80/20 program, Atlantic Yards is actually a 50/30/20 program, noted City Limits Weekly.
The Times suggested that the project might indeed provide 40 percent affordable housing:
But if the developer chooses to build the maximum of 1,000 moderately priced for-sale units described in the Acorn agreement and builds them off-site, then the total number of for-sale and rental units associated with the project would reach 8,300, of which 3,250 would be priced below market rates - about 40 percent.
Much of the city's moderately priced housing is built through an arrangement called the 80-20 Program, under which city and state agencies subsidize construction projects by providing developers with tax-exempt bonds. In exchange, the developers set aside 20 percent of the apartment units for tenants who earn 50 percent or less of the area's median income.
But what percentage would be truly affordable, to people earning under Brooklyn's median income? Despite the mention of the 80/20 program, Atlantic Yards is actually a 50/30/20 program, noted City Limits Weekly.
As noted in Chapter 1 of my report, the project relies on a regional area median income (AMI) of $62,800 (for a family of four), rather than the $35,000 AMI in Brooklyn. The average middle-income household--occupying 30% of the total 4,500 units and 60% of the “affordable" rentals--would earn $75,000. So if most of the "affordable" condos go to people earning $75,000 and up, how is ACORN helping its constituency?
Back to Lewis
Back to Lewis
The Times article ends by quoting ACORN's Bertha Lewis. While in Ratner's latest Brooklyn Standard, she continued to insist that the 50-50 program had not been compromised (mentioning the 2,250 rentals but nothing about the offsite condos), here she was a little more circumspect:
Ms. Lewis said that Acorn remained a strong supporter of the project and of the agreement with Forest City Ratner. But she said she was negotiating with the company, and with the government agencies that help subsidize housing, to help make a greater proportion of the for-sale apartments available below market prices.
"We know that when we get through this thing, half of all the housing is going to be affordable - half of the rental, half of everything else," she said. "We haven't gotten down to the last part of this. But our whole principle is 50-50."
So the article ends with ACORN, not any critics. Wouldn't it be worth pointing out that ACORN is required to publicly support the project? The MOU states:
"ACORN agrees to take reasonable steps to publicly support the Project by, among other things, appearing with the Developer before the Public Parties, community organizations and the media as part of a coordinated effort to realize and advance the Project and the contemplated creation of affordable housing.”
Ms. Lewis said that Acorn remained a strong supporter of the project and of the agreement with Forest City Ratner. But she said she was negotiating with the company, and with the government agencies that help subsidize housing, to help make a greater proportion of the for-sale apartments available below market prices.
"We know that when we get through this thing, half of all the housing is going to be affordable - half of the rental, half of everything else," she said. "We haven't gotten down to the last part of this. But our whole principle is 50-50."
So the article ends with ACORN, not any critics. Wouldn't it be worth pointing out that ACORN is required to publicly support the project? The MOU states:
"ACORN agrees to take reasonable steps to publicly support the Project by, among other things, appearing with the Developer before the Public Parties, community organizations and the media as part of a coordinated effort to realize and advance the Project and the contemplated creation of affordable housing.”
Why not ask ACORN why its efforts mostly help people outside its constituency?
"Carefully sculptured"
One more thing. The Times article offered an unsubstantiated assessment of the project design:
The other towers - some smaller than before, some larger - still stand amid acres of green space carefully sculptured to welcome residents of the adjoining streets.
That may well be what's intended, but it certainly deserves comment from an authority.
